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1.1 Background   
In 1963 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) summed up what the European 
countries had done in forming the European Union by stating that;  
‘The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which 
the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields and the subjects of which 
comprise not only member states but also their nationals1.’ 
The ECJ in this case aptly described the essential elements that should constitute 
any attempt at regional integration. Since the creation of the internal market in the EU, the 
economic strength of the region increased dramatically with the regions gross domestic 
product (GDP) accounting 20% of the global gross domestic product in 20142.  As such the 
creation of these new legal regimes of international law has always been seen as a pre-
requisite for economic development especially within the African context. In recognition 
of this African countries united to create the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and 
subsequently the African Union (AU). Central to the success of the AU is the efficiency of 
the mechanics of its recognized regional economic communities (REC’s) in promoting 
regional integration in each particular sub-region.  
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1996 sought to spur 
economic integration in the region through integration in line with AU objectives. Since 
the dawn of democracy in the region, SADC has witnessed some growth in cross-border 
trade3. Intra-regional trade has been dominated by the more industrialized countries such as 
                                                          
1
 Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratis der 
Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 
2IMF World Economic Outlook 2014 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=28&pr.y=14&sy=2014&ey=2014&s
csm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=998&s=NGDPD%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC&grp=1&a=1 accessed 
on June 12 2015 
3 What are the critical issues Arising from SADC Trade Integration Process , DPRU Brief no 00/P3 (July 2000) 
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South Africa and Zimbabwe4. The rest of the SADC member states have so far not been 
able to compete efficiently.  
The trade surplus these countries enjoy is unsustainable and detrimental to regional 
integration. Moreover, intra-regional trade in the SADC remained significantly lower than 
in other regions indicating a lack of integration. Intra-regional trade in the European Union 
(EU) stood at 66% of total trade while for the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
it stood at 56%. This is considerably higher than those of SADC which stood at 11% in 
2000 and further dropped to 9% in 20065. Thus trade within SADC needs to be enhanced if 
any meaningful development is to transpire.  
In recognition of this, the member states of SADC in 1996 signed the SADC 
Protocol on Trade (the Protocol) to address the discrepancies in trade. Article 3 of the 
Protocol specifically recognized barriers to intra-SADC trade. It came into force in 2000 
after ratification of more than two thirds of member states with the aim of creating a free 
trade area in the region (FTA). The first step in the trade liberalization process was to be 
completed over a period of 8 years with periodical tariff phase down from the time the 
Protocol came into force6.  
1.2 Thesis Problem and Research Question 
It follows from the foregoing that the proposed research question is as follows;  
“Is the SADC Trade Protocol adequate to meet its stated objectives and to address 
the problems of limited intra-SADC trade?”  
This thesis will argue that although the protocol has had some impact on intra-
regional trade, some provisions contained within it remain a barrier to trade. The thesis 
will focus on how the SADC protocol on trade can address solve the problems of intra-
SADC trade. It will be argued that certain provisions within the Protocol undermine the 
objectives of the protocol as outlined in Article 2. These provisions include but are not 
limited to the rules of origin, non-harmonization of external tariffs, derogations to the 
                                                          
4 What are the critical issues Arising from SADC Trade Integration Process , DPRU Brief no 00/P3 (July 2000) 
5 Southern African Development Research Network: Implementation of the SADC Protocol and Intra-SADC trade 
performance (2008) 




elimination of barriers in intra-SADC trade provisions found in Article 3, and inadequately 
tackling non-tariff measures. In examining the protocol, reference will be made to the 
similar provisions contained in the East African Community (EAC).  
The EAC could be used in this sense to help illuminate ways in which SADC might 
improve its provisions in the trade protocol to stimulate intra-SADC trade. The EAC is 
regarded as one of the most advanced RTA’s in Africa thus providing a solid foundation 
for comparison and providing far-reaching insight as to how to address the problem of 
limited intra-regional trade. The Protocol will be critically analyzed further in light of the 
broader SADC aims and objectives with commentary on the extent to which it assists in 
bringing them to fulfillment. 
Ultimately it will be highlighted that the Protocol has not had a far-reaching impact 
as may have been envisaged. Although total exports in merchandise from the region grew 
from $14 billion in 2000 to $58 billion in 20117, intra-SADC trade actually decreased 
during the same period. Most countries in SADC have actually reduced their share of 
exports to the SADC region during the period from 2008 to 2009 with a decrease in intra-
SADC trade from $46.6 billion to $38.8 billion8  illustrating how despite the 
implementation of the Protocol, problems of intra-SADC trade are not entirely resolved.  
As such it is arguable that the Protocol does little to enhance trade in the region and 
ultimately undermines the regional integration agenda. The protocol allows Member States 
to grant or maintain preferential trade arrangements with 3rd countries provided they do not 
conflict with the objectives of SADC. This could provide insight as to the growth of 
exports of SADC in the same period. The protocol further fails to address the issue of a 
harmonized external tariff.  
The lack of coherence on this issue means that SADC lacks a global, outward 
looking approach in regional integration which is essential if any meaningful and tangible 
                                                          
7 SADC Statistics Yearbook, Intra-SADC Trade for SADC (2011) available at http://www.sadc.int/information-
services/sadc-statistics/sadc-statiyearbook/ 




outcomes are to be realized9. The complicated rules of origin and the lack of a clear 
approach to non-tariff measures also do little to address these concerns. It is against this 
background that it is proposed that a critical analysis of the Protocol occurs to provide 
insight into the mechanics of the Protocol and its impact on trade and ultimately 
integration in the region. The research methodology will consist of articles, journals, 

















                                                          








The proceeding discourse will articulate the historical background of trade in 
southern Africa illustrating how it rose to be integral to the economic development the 
countries within this region. Moving from the historical context, intra-trade regional trade 
will be examined against the background of emerging modern challenges in the region 
before moving on to illuminate recent developments and efforts to encourage intra-regional 
trade. It will be argued that much progress has been made on this front, however southern 
Africa still has of challenges to address before the benefits of increased intra-regional trade 
and integration can have far-reaching effects on the regional economy.   
 
2.2 Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Southern African Customs Union 
and Central African Federation 
 
Regional integration and intra-regional trade in southern Africa can also be traced 
back to colonial times where the British colonial administrators took the view that some 
countries would be better off under regional integration schemes due to their small markets 
and economies. Thus integration was supposed seen as experiment to create larger, viable 
colonies that were better positioned to handle independence10. Most countries were deemed 
too small in terms of resource endowment to be self-sufficient. Economic development 
thus rendered regional integration a necessity11. One of the very first attempts was the 
creation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) established after an agreement 
between the British colonial administrators in what are now Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland 
                                                          
10
 See http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/nyasaland.htm accessed on September 19 2014 
11 Samir Amin,  Derrick Chitala,  Ibbo Mandaza, SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and Development in 
Southern Africa at pg 183 
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(referred to as the BLS states) and the newly formed Government of the Union of South 
Africa in 191012. It is referred to as the oldest customs union in the world arguably making 
Southern Africa a pioneer in the regional integration agenda.  
The agreement between these states created a common external tariff (CET) on all 
goods imported into the Union from the rest of the world; a common pool of customs 
duties as per the total volume of external trade; and excise duties based on the total 
production and consumption of excisable goods. It also created the free movement of 
SACU manufactured products within SACU, without any duties or quantitative 
restrictions13. The customs union agreement was renegotiated in 1969 and most recently in 
2002 which entered into force in 2004. Central to the objectives of SACU was the idea to 
promote intra-regional trade and the integration of member states into the global 
economy14. This reflects recognition by the Member States of the importance of trade and 
regional integration in accelerating economic development. Historically, the larger and 
more dominant economy of South Africa sought to use SACU as a means of gaining 
political support from the BLS states to an increasingly isolated apartheid regime.  
It follows that regional integration in southern Africa has been strongly affected by 
the conflict between apartheid South Africa and the rest of the region. Three distinct 
periods define integration in the region in this regard. Firstly, the period ending in 1980 
with the independence of Zimbabwe; this made the region a “buffer zone” for the apartheid 
regime. Until this period integration interests were pursued by the colonial powers. 
Secondly, it also consisted of the period from 1980-90 where South Africa utilized 
political and other means to try and destabilize of the region in the wake of growing 
resistance to apartheid and South Africa's increased international isolation. Integration 
efforts were mainly concerned with reducing South Africa’s economic dominance in the 
region.  
Finally, the region then arrived at a period of transformation as the isolation of 
South Africa reduced making it made an important and active player in the region. SACU 
                                                          
12 Christian Peters-Berries Regional Integration in Southern Africa, A Guidebook, Chapter 6 pg. 42 
13Brief on SACU, Ministry of External Affairs (E& SA Division) found at 
http://www.meaindia.nic.in/staticfile/historicalbackgroundSACU.pdf  accessed on 3rd July 2014 
14 Article 2 of the SACU 2002 Agreement 
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was able to withstand the conflict which engulfed the southern African region that has been 
referred to as “southern Africa’s cold war15.” South Africa still managed to negotiate a 
formula for revenue distribution giving preference to the BLS states and thus constituted 
an important source of income for the smaller BLS economies16.  
Although Namibia was a “de-facto” member as it was mostly administered by 
South Africa it officially joined SACU in 1990 after gaining independence. It too benefited 
from this revenue distribution formula. South Africa consolidated its strong position within 
SACU as it introduced the attachment of the BLS currencies to the South African Rand 
which was referred to as the Rand Monetary Union (RMU) or the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA)17. However, Botswana left the CMA in 1976 after its economy had become strong 
enough to sustain its own currency18.  
The new agreement in 2002 signaled a change in SACU as the post-apartheid 
Government of South Africa took a change in policy direction. A new formula for revenue 
distribution was also introduced with the establishment of the new agreement. Rather than 
sharing a fixed percentage of all duties amongst the four smaller economies, the new 
formula takes into account their socio-economic performance and developmental needs19. 
Previously, all SACU institutions were supported by the South African Government with 
no separate institutions in existence. However the new agreement established under Article 
7 created the SACU Council of Ministers, the Secretariat, the Commission, National 
Bodies, a Tariff Board, Technical Liaison Committees and a Tribunal20.  
A later attempt at regional integration in the southern African region came in the 
form of what was called the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland or Central African 
Federation (CAF) which failed to survive due to African independence movements. The 
CAF which was in existence between 1953 and 1963 consisted of Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe and Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi). The federation was 
                                                          
15 Graham, Matthew , Cold War in Southern Africa, in: Africa Spectrum (2010), 45, 1, 131-139 
16 , Christian Peters-Berries Regional Integration in Southern Africa, A Guidebook, Chapter 6, pg.43 
17 Jian-Ye Wang, Iyabo Masha, Kazuko Shirono, and Leighton Harris, The Common Monetary Area in Southern 
Africa: Shocks, Adjustment, and Policy Challenges,  
18 Christian Peters-Berries, Regional Integration in Southern Africa, A Guidebook, Chapter 6, pg 43 
19 Christian Peters-Berries, Regional Integration in Southern Africa, A Guidebook Chapter 6, pg 43 
20 Brief on SACU, Ministry of External Affairs (E& SA Division) found at 
http://www.meaindia.nic.in/staticfile/historicalbackgroundSACU.pdf, accessed on 7th July 2014 
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seen as a counter to the minority rule in South Africa21 and was an attempt to suppress 
independence movements in Malawi and Zambia.  
The CAF operated as a federal system which had a number of institutions which 
sought to create one large supranational body22. The structure of the CAF placed great 
importance on the development of Southern Rhodesia. The income generated from the 
Northern Rhodesia copper mines went largely to Southern Rhodesia whilst Nyasaland was 
utilized as a source of cheap labor23. Naturally, as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
gained independence to become the states of Zambia and Malawi respectively, the CAF 
came to an end.  
By 1980 independence had reached many southern African countries but during 
this time the economic dichotomy of the region was largely in favor of South Africa. 
Following this, integration efforts shifted with the main aim of reducing apartheid South 
Africa’s dominance in the region. These efforts involved countries that were known as the 
“frontline states” (FS) and included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It was thought that regional integration 
between these countries was essential in order to reduce “excessive economic 
dependence24” on South Africa. 
 
2.3 From Southern African Development Coordination Conference to 
Southern African Development Community 
 
The effort to become less reliant on the larger economy of South Africa was not the 
only catalyst for the establishment of the third regional economic community in Southern 
Africa. It was also an attempt to counter the proposal by South Africa to establish a 
regional body called the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). Comprising 
of South Africa and its three independent former homelands, it was anticipated that these 
                                                          
21 Alistair Boddy-Evans,  Federation of Rhodesia And Nyasaland found at 
http://africanhistory.about.com/od/eraindependence/a/Federation-Of-Rhodesia-And-Nyasaland.htm, accessed on 7th 
July 2014 
22 Christian Peters-Berries Regional Integration in Southern Africa, A Guidebook, Chapter 6 pg 43 
23 Christian Peters-Berries, Regional Integration in Southern Africa, A Guidebook, Chapter 6, pg. 44 
24 Sir Seretse Khama in SADCC (1981) op- cit,, p.viii 
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countries would not merely expand existing economic ties, but that they would develop a 
common approach in the security political field25. Essentially, CONSAS was supposed to 
be a political buffer zone for the apartheid government. In 1980 after a long process of 
meetings these FS countries successfully signed and adopted the Lusaka Declaration26 
which established the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). 
Namibia later joined after gaining independence in 1990. Although the main driving force 
of the SADCC was the fight against apartheid, it was a clear effort at regional integration 
in the region reflected by the language of the declaration.  
 
Among their aims was the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable 
regional integration and the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of 
national, interstate and regional policies27.  Although its aim was not to create a common 
market however it is clear that the heads of state sought to promote trade through 
cooperation in specially identified areas. SADCC developed a program of action that 
identified defined economic activities and development projects to be pursued. Each 
member state took responsibility for a particular sector as the organization focused its 
attention on the coordination of members’ development initiatives in favor of formulating 
a regional economic development strategy28.  
 
Promoting the activities of member states’ infrastructure and production sectors 
(mining, agriculture etc.) was the goal. Cooperation in the field of transport infrastructure 
was central to the objectives of the organization given the land-locked countries of the 
region’s dependence on South Africa for the transport of goods. Under this Mozambique 
was assigned responsibility for transport and communications; Zimbabwe for food 
security; Angola for energy, etc. Technical units were also established in each country in 
order to deal with each country’s relevant portfolio.  The sectoral approach also fostered a 
                                                          
25
 Deon Geldenhuys, The Constellation of Southern African States and the Southern African Development Co-
ordination Concil: Towards a new Regional Stalemate?, The South African Institute of International Affairs (1981) 
at pg. 2 
26 Entitled Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation 
27 Lusaka Declaration, Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation 
28 Maxi Schoeman,  From SADCC to SADC and Beyond: The Politics of Economic Integration, at  pg 4 
14 
 
sense of common identity and common responsibility with every member, regardless of 
size, having a role to play29. 
 
The Lusaka Declaration was not a legally binding instrument. This was not an 
effort to create supranational institutions which are a central feature of the modern regional 
integration models. It was in part member states’ desire not to infringe their newly 
acquired sovereign independence from their colonial administrators30. In 1981 the member 
states signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the Institutionalization of SADCC. 
This outlined that the main institutions would be the summit of the heads of state; council 
of ministers; the standing committees of officials; and sectorial commissions. The 
understanding was further amended in 1982 to include the secretariat.  
 
Like most African regional integration schemes, the hierarchy of the SADCC 
institutions placed supreme authority on the summits of the heads of state. African heads of 
state sought to consolidate their hard fought sovereign power through avoiding to create 
supranational institutions. Meanwhile, the council of ministers was made up of senior 
government ministers. Their role was to direct, supervise and coordinate SADCC 
activity31. Permanent secretaries to the ministers made up the standing committees of 
officials tasked with performing ‘collectively for the Council the functions a permanent 
secretary performs for his minister32.’ Sectorial commissions could be formed by the 
summit and once formed constituted legally binding bodies. During its period the summit 
only instituted two commissions; one in transport and communications and another in 
agriculture.  
 
During its early years the SADCC did little to achieve a lesser degree of 
independence from South Africa through economic integration. The transportation and 
communications initiatives instituted by the body were all proving futile. The 
Zambia/Tanzania road highway went into liquidation in 1985, the Malawi-Beira and 
                                                          
29
 See http://www.trocaire.org/resources/tdr-article/southern-african-development-coordination-conference-sadcc 
accessed on September 30 2014 
30 Brid Bowen, The Southern African Development Conference, Trocaire Development Revie, Dublin (1990), p29-45 
31 Brid Bowen, The Southern African Development Conference, Trocaire Development Revie, Dublin (1990), p29-45 
32 I Simba, and F. Wells, (1984) Development Cooperation in Southern Africa, Paris, OECD, p.20 
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Malawi-Nacala routes33 were closed by 1982 and the Zimbabwe-Maputo route was closed 
in 198434. This is reflected in the gloomy economic performance by the region from 1980 
to 1986. Gross National Product (GNP) per capita dropped by 12 per cent on average 
during this period. Furthermore debt as a percentage of the GNP nearly tripled and the debt 
service ratio as a percentage of exports almost doubled in the region35. Thus the institution 
in 1985 decided to undertake a review in order to highlight its difficulties and institutional 
limitations.  
 
Following this, SADCC started to place emphasis on trade from 1986 which paved 
the way for the institution to open up to the private sector for the first time in 198736. This 
was supposed to act as a catalyst for the industrial development program which until this 
stage had received little support. This was subsequently a recurring theme in SADCC 
agenda until its demise in 1992. Consequently (particularly from 1987 onwards) signs of 
progress in achieving SADCC aims started to become apparent. In the transport sector, it 
became possible to fly between any of the capital cities within SADCC without using 
South African routes which constituted an important step towards reducing the regions 
heavy reliance on that country’s transport routes.  
 
Additionally it became cheaper by approximately $400 per ton37 for the region to 
use the Mozambican Beira port rather than South Africa’s Durban port. It was estimated 
that 63 per cent of SADCC trade during this period went through the regions own ports 
rather than those of South Africa38. Specifically, Zimbabwe during this period had 
increased its use of the Beira corridor by 13 per cent between 1985 and 1986 which 
reduced its reliance on South African routes by approximately 50 per cent in 1987.  
 
                                                          
33 It was thought that these transport routes to the Mozambican ports would reduce the regions reliance on South 
Africa’s transport routes.    
34 Brid Bowen, The Southern African Development Conference, Trocaire Development Revie, Dublin (1990), p29-45 
35 Brid Bowen, The Southern African Development Conference, Trocaire Development Revie, Dublin (1990), p29-45 
36 Brid Bowen, The Southern African Development Conference, Trocaire Development Revie, Dublin (1990), p29-45 
37 AWEPAA, (1987) Southern Africa's Future and Europe's Role, The Hague, p.9 
38 Africa Research Bulletin (ARB) (1989), para. 24 
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On the other hand, Zambia had increased its trade of copper through the use of the 
Beira corridor by 87 per cent39. Meanwhile by 1987 Malawi had reduced its reliance on 
South African routes to 50 per cent. It is clear that although the SADCC had little 
successes it did manage to make meaningful strides in achieving some of its objectives, 
particularly in its last three years.  
 
However, to mobilize resources to promote equitable regional growth and reduce 
the dependence on South Africa required a large amount of external funding40. This 
reliance on donors to facilitate its operations eventually hindered its ability to make far-
reaching levels of integration and promote intra-regional trade. This was exacerbated in the 
early 90’s as the apartheid regime in South Africa seemed to be coming to an inevitable 
end. The donors of SADCC had mainly seen their financial support of the organization as a 
way of countering the apartheid government. Consequently the justification for having the 
SADCC began to ‘unravel41’.  
 
2.4 The Establishment of SADC  
 
Despite the end of the SADCC seemingly approaching, SADCC remained fortified 
in their drive towards regional integration. The Preferential Free Trade Area (PTA) 
between eastern and southern African states signed in 1983 which SADCC would be part 
of helped member states remain resolved in pursuing regional integration as a vehicle for 
economic development. This was a response to the aims and objectives of the Abuja Treaty 
which sought to create a common market covering Africa as a whole42 using the regional 
economic communities as the building blocks for this end goal. It was apparent that in 
order to achieve this, the non-binding agreement covering SADCC would have to 
transform to a more solid, legally binding agreement43. As such in 1992 SADCC was not 
disbanded but was reborn as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 
                                                          
39 ARB, Seprember 1987, p.14 
40
 Brid Bowen, The Southern African Development Conference, Trocaire Development Revie, Dublin (1990), p 41 
41 Siobhan Clearly, Regional Integration and the Southern African Development Community at pg 3 
42 Siobhan Clearly, Regional Integration and the Southern African Development Community at pg 3 
43 Article 3 of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community establishes the binding nature of the 
treaty and defines the legal status of the organization  
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heads of state or government of southern Africa signed the treaty at Windhoek, Namibia, in 
August 1992.   
 
The organisation continued to grow with Namibia joining in 1990, South Africa in 
1994, Mauritius in 1995, Seychelles and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1997. 
As it currently stands SADC has a total of 15 member states. With the addition of the new 
member states, the SADC treaty was amended with the signing and adoption of the 
Agreement Amending the Treaty of The Southern African Development Community in 
March 2001. Central to the new organization’s goals is to further socio-economic 
cooperation and integration as well as political and security cooperation among the 15 
southern African states. From the outset, trade liberalization became pivotal as members 
became aware of regional imbalances among member states. This was reflected in the 
wording of the treaty which outlines that SADC aims to achieve development and 
economic growth through regional integration44. 
 
As part of this endeavor, the treaty articulates that central to the organisation’s 
objective is the promotion of economic growth through intra-regional trade to support the 
socially disadvantaged and enhance the standard of life of the people of southern Africa. It 
is the goal of SADC to eradicate poverty through facilitating free trade within the region45. 
In order to ensure this, SADC envisaged the elimination of trade barriers, specifically 
reducing intra-regional imports by up to 85%. Furthermore, support is given to member 
states to strengthen their capacity to negotiate and implement trade agreements46. It is clear 
that the promotion of intra-regional trade is fundamental to SADC.   
 
SADC deliberately avoided the creation of supranational institutions and took a 
ground breaking approach to regional integration compared to other African attempts, 
following the institutional structure of the SADCC47. The main bodies responsible for 
implementing SADC’s regional economic integration agenda consist of the  Summit, 
                                                          
44 Article 5(1)(a) of the SADC Treaty (1992) 
45
 Article 5(1)(a) of the SADC Treaty (1992) 
46
 See http://www.sadc.int/themes/economic-development/trade/trade-liberalisation/ accessed on October 01 2014 
47 Jakobeit, Hartzenberg and Charalambides 2005 www.acp-eu-trade.org 12 accessed on 17th July 2014 
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which is made up of Heads of State and Government; the Troika48; the  Council of 
Ministers; the Integrated Committee of Ministers; the Tribunal; SADC National 
Committees; Standing Committee of Officials; and the Secretariat. The tribunal 
represented the only new institution introduced by the Windhoek Treaty. The Summit (as 
with SADCC previously) is made up of heads of state and government and is the ‘supreme 
policy making institution49’ of SADC.  
 
The Summit makes binding decisions on policy matters and it has the power to 
appoint the Executive Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the Secretariat and admits new 
members into SADC50. The troika consists of the Chair, the incoming Chair and the 
outgoing Chair of the SADC, which has been effective since it was established in Maputo, 
Mozambique in 199951 by the Summit. The Troika also applies with respect not only to the 
Summit but also to the Organ, the Council, the integrated Committee of Ministers and the 
standing Committee of Officials52. It meets more often than the Summit and its decisions 
and work are closely linked to the Summit thus strategically it plays an essential role in the 
implementation of the regional integration agenda53.  
 
On the other hand, the Council consists of ministers from member states usually 
from the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economic Planning, or Finance. It plays a central 
role as an advisory body to the Summit on matters of overall policy, and the efficient and 
harmonious functioning and development of SADC54. This is an important function for the 
Council since the Summit normally meets once or twice a year. It is essential in keeping 
the most important organ of the SADC well informed of the developments around regional 
integration. However, the Council remains under the authority of the Summit and must 
report directly to it. 
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The Integrated Committee of Ministers is made up of at least two ministers from 
each member state and it meets at least twice a year. The Integrated Committee of 
Ministers oversees the activities of the four core areas of integration, notably Trade, 
Industry, Finance and Investment55; Infrastructure and Services56; Food, Agriculture and 
Natural Resources57; and Social and Human Development and Special Programs58, 
including the implementation of the Strategic Plan in their areas of competence.  
 
The committee is responsible to the Council on all matters and also provides policy 
guidance to the secretariat and makes decisions on matters pertaining to the Directorates, 
as well as monitoring and evaluating their work. It also has decision-making powers to 
ensure the rapid implementation of the programs that would otherwise wait for a formal 
meeting of the Council59. Another body which stands as an advisory to the Council is the 
Standing Committee of Officials. This technical advisory committee to the Council is 
made up of one permanent secretary from the ministry of the Member State which serves 
as the SADC national contact point. They meet at least four times a year with their 
decisions being made by consensus, with their main function to process documentation 
from the Integrated Committee of Ministers and report to the Council. Meanwhile, the 
Secretariat is the principal executive institution of the SADC responsible for the strategic 
planning, coordination and management of SADC programs60. It is headed by an 
Executive Secretary and has its headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana61.  
 
The Secretariat is the driving force behind the strategic planning and management 
of SADC programs and is in charge of implementing the decisions of the Summit and 
Council. It is also in charge of organizing and coordinating SADC meetings at all levels62. 
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The Secretariat further plays a key role in mobilizing financial support from both the 
private and public sector stakeholders for the purpose of funding regional integration 
programs such as transport corridors. Moreover, the representation and promotion of 
SADC is also a key responsibility of the Secretariat, as the institution requires key 
representation at regional and multilateral levels. The Secretariat also represents SADC 
outside the African continent. However, the biggest challenge for the Secretariat is the 
apparent unwillingness of member states to surrender national initiative and active 
representativeness to the principle of supra-nationalism63. Again this is a reflection of 
African heads state safeguarding their own sovereignty which was hard won from colonial 
administrators. It is clear that sovereignty poses a great challenge to regional integration in 
Africa in this regard.  
 
These challenges were severely highlighted with the case of the SADC tribunal. 
The tribunal was established following Article 9 of the 1992 SADC treaty. It became 
operational in 2005 and was based in Windhoek, Namibia. The body was instituted to 
provide legal guidance on all SADC related issues and signaled an integral part of the 
regional integration agenda for SADC. The Tribunal was mandated to give “advisory 
opinions on such matters as the Summit or the Council may refer to it64”. It had jurisdiction 
over all disputes and application in relation to the provisions of the SADC treaty and 
protocol provisions65. According to the protocol of the tribunal, it was to consist of not less 
than ten Members, appointed from nationals of States who possess the qualifications 
required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective States or who are 
jurists of recognised competence66. 
 
However, the tribunal faced its biggest challenge early on in the case of Gramara 
(Pty) Ltd and one other v The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and two others67. 
The Zimbabwean courts refused to enforce a decision of the tribunal arguing that the 
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decision was contrary to the public policy policies of Zimbabwe. The Tribunal had found 
that the government of Zimbabwe may not evict farmer Mike Campbell from his land, and 
that farm evictions per Amendment 17 of Zimbabwe’s constitution amounted to de facto 
discrimination of Whites. The Zimbabwean Government rejected this ruling, challenging 
its legality and lobbied the Summit to suspend the Tribunal. The tribunal was disbanded 
following a decision of the Summit in 2010 in Windhoek68 pending an independent six-
month review of its role, functions and terms of reference. However, a new protocol was 
adopted by the Summit to reconstitute the tribunal albeit with reduced functions69.  
 
On the whole, the decision of the Summit in this regard is detrimental to the 
regional integration agenda. Trade and other policies are not enough on their own to have a 
far-reaching effect on integration and ultimately development in the SADC region. The 
rule of law is also an important basis for regional integration70.  While on the outset it is 
clear that SADC has strong and solid institutional foundations for the implementation of 
the regional integration agenda, certain provisions need to address the apparent gaps in the 
regional integration efforts. Such gaps are not only limited to the SADC tribunal and its 
challenges but in other areas of the SADC set up as a whole, specifically the SADC trade 
protocol. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
It follows from the foregoing that the southern African region shares a long and 
integrated history of trade and integration. Intra-regional trade rose to prominence prior to 
the colonial era where communities in southern Africa traded in ivory and gold among 
other goods. The significance of trade further increased with the dawn of colonialism when 
trade was recognised as an essential tool to promote the economic prospects the small and 
fragmented economies. It was realized that to promote intra-regional trade, the countries of 
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the region had to integrate economically. This led to the creation of regional blocs within 
the region. The larger markets established by the blocs were seen as a way of promoting 
free trade and ultimately a way of enhancing the economic growth. 
 
With the dawn of the apartheid regime in South Africa, trade became fundamental 
for more than merely economic reasons. The diverging ideologies of the governments at 
the time meant that trade became a leveraging tool for different governments to safe guard 
and advance their interests. It was for this reason that intra-regional trade gained further 
prominence as it became intertwined with the political and social future of the FS states.  
 
A great deal depended on the success of these states in promoting intra-regional 
trade between themselves and becoming economically independent on South Africa. 
Ultimately (with the demise of the apartheid regime) the intra-regional trade remained 
relevant and central to the southern African region. In order to promote equitable and 
sustainable economic growth and ultimately reduce poverty levels in the region, the 
promotion of intra-regional trade was to take a central role. As such every effort must be 












CHAPTER THREE  
The SADC Trade Protocol: An Analysis 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The following chapter will seek to illustrate the aims and objectives of the SADC 
trade protocol in relation to the promotion of intra-regional trade. A critical analysis of the 
protocol and certain provisions will follow which will endeavor to outline its impact in 
promoting trade within the region. Particular emphasis will also be placed upon the areas 
in which the protocol falls short. It will be argued that although the protocol lays a solid 
foundation for the promotion of trade in the region, there are provisions within the 
instrument which pose a threat to the expansion of intra-regional trade.  
 
3.2 Introduction to the SADC Protocol on Trade and its objectives 
Intra-regional trade in southern Africa has been on a steady increase since the 
inception of the regional bodies of SADCC and subsequently SADC. It is estimated that in 
1996 intra-SADC trade was valued at US$ 9 million, an increase of US$ 2.9 million from 
the previous year.71 However, intra-SADC trade still remained significantly low compared 
to other regions of the world. For example, intra-regional trade in the European Union 
(EU) stood at 66 per cent in 2000 and in the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) it 
stood at 56 per cent. This is in comparison to intra-regional trade in SADC which stood at 
11 per cent.72 Despite this, intra-SADC trade has continued to grow and was valued at 
about US$ 558 million73 in 2011.  
Consequently, in an effort to facilitate the growth of intra-regional trade and 
integration, SADC adopted the Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development 
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Community (the Trade Protocol) in Maseru, Lesotho in 1996 and entered into force in 
200174. The protocol on trade was originally only ratified by Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Madagascar acceded to the protocol in 2006 and submitted a tariff offer that 
was accepted and ready for commence implementation. Angola, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Seychelles remain outside this agreement.  
The main objectives of the protocol are to ‘further liberalize intra-regional trade in 
goods and services; to ensure efficient production within SADC reflecting the current and 
dynamic comparative advantages of its members; to contribute towards the improvement 
of the climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign investment; to enhance the economic 
development, diversification and industrialization of the region; and to ultimately establish 
a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the SADC Region.75’ 
The goal was to have 85% of all intra-SADC trade at zero tariffs by 2008 and the 
remaining 15% to be liberalized by 2012.76In achieving these objectives, the Protocol aims 
to eliminate tariff barriers to intra-SADC trade specifically import and export duties and 
eliminate non-tariff barriers such as quantitative restrictions on exports and imports. The 
tariff phase down commenced on September 1, 2001 and was scheduled to result in a 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) compliant FTA by January 1, 2008.77 The reduction of 
tariffs was to be carried out on the basis of four categories. Category A required the 
immediate reduction of duty to zero per cent at the beginning of the implementation 
period, by 2000.78 These included goods that already had low or zero tariffs. The second 
category B dealt with goods that constitute significant sources of customs revenue and 
whose tariffs were to be removed over 8 years, by 2008.79 This was recognition by SADC 
that the quick and sudden removal of tariffs could have a devastating impact on the 
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economies of some countries which would ultimately undermine the promotion of intra-
regional trade and ultimately undermine regional integration efforts.  
Moreover, categories A and B goods should account for 85% of intra-SADC trade 
so that by 2008 SADC could be regarded as a free trade area in compliance with Article 24 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).Category C deals with sensitive 
products such as sugar (imports sensitive to domestic industrial and agricultural activities) 
whose tariffs were to be eliminated between 2008 and 2012. Category C is limited to a 
maximum of 15% of each Member’s intra-SADC merchandise trade. On the other hand, 
category E is goods that can be exempted from preferential treatment under Articles 9 and 
10 of the Trade Protocol such as firearms and munitions, comprising of a small fraction of 
intra-SADC trade. 
A member state assents to the protocol through submitting an instrument of 
implementation, which is in fact a tariff phase down schedule over the implementation 
period.80 These offers are country specific and are based on the principle of reciprocity. 
This means that any preferences with regards to tariffs will only be extended to member 
states that have also submitted their instruments of implementation. The tariff 
liberalization process under the protocol is based on an offer approach founded on the idea 
of asymmetry, which takes into account the level of development of member states. This 
principle ensures that the least-developed member states are allowed a slower phase down 
period. It may be viewed as a means of enhancing equity in the region owing largely to the 
disparity between the larger economy of South Africa and the smaller economies of other 
SADC member states. Thus each member state submitted two offers – one schedule for 
South Africa and a ‘differentiated offer’ to the rest of SADC (excluding South Africa). 
This allows for a faster tariff phase down schedule.81 
Members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) made a single offer to 
the other SADC members by virtue of having a common external tariff (CET). This 
collective offer to the other SADC members, provided for the immediate reduction on 
duties to achieve zero tariffs after five years. This however did not include sensitive 
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products. Zimbabwe and Mauritius (as developing economies compared to the rest of the 
region) also agreed to start their tariff reductions earlier than other non-SACU members.82 
3.3 The main provisions of the Protocol 
The protocol sets out that the modalities for implementing the elimination of trade 
barriers shall be overseen by the committee of ministers responsible for trade matters.83 As 
previously stated, it outlines a period of 8 years from the entry into force of the protocol as 
the time frame in which to achieve these objectives.84 The Protocol first placed a cap on 
the amount of import duties with the requirement that member states shall not raise import 
duties beyond those in existence at the time of entry into force of this Protocol and further 
set the reduction of import duties to be gradually reduced in phases within the 8 year 
period.85 It was to be accompanied by an industrialization strategy to improve the 
competitiveness of member states. Here SADC established a strong foundation on which to 
expand and grow intra-regional trade. Not only would the industrialization strategy ensure 
that SADC member states become competitive in trade in goods it would also encourage 
intra-regional trade.  
The Protocol also outlined quantitative import restrictions addressing non-tariff 
barriers. Member states are obliged not to apply any new quantitative restrictions and shall 
in accordance with Article 3; phase out the existing restrictions on the import of goods 
originating in member states.86 Similar provisions also apply in relation to quantitative 
restrictions on exports.87 The protocol further places an obligation on member states not to 
apply any export duties on goods for export to other member states. However, this does not 
prevent member states from applying duties to third countries outside the community.88 
The provisions stipulated in article 3 are also of particular interest. The provision 
states that: The process and modalities for the phased elimination of tariffs and non-tariff 
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barriers shall be determined by the Committee of Ministers responsible for trade matters 
(CMT) having due regard to the following: that the elimination of barriers to trade shall be 
achieved within a time frame of eight years from entry into force of this Protocol. That 
different tariff lines may be applied within the agreed time frame for different products, in 
the process of eliminating tariffs and NTBs and the process and the method of eliminating 
barriers to intra-SADC trade, and the criteria of listing products for special consideration, 
shall be negotiated in the context of the Trade Negotiating Forum (TNF) among others89. 
 
This is central for the promotion of intra-SADC trade, in which substantially all 
trade must be liberalized. At the time the protocol entered into force, member states were 
apparently not ready to commit to the effect of the legal position stipulated by its 
provisions.90 The binding obligations outlined were unclear. The CMT was subsequently 
tasked to elaborate appropriate and clear obligations enunciated by Article 3.91 Moreover, 
the process and the method of eliminating barriers to intra-SADC trade, and the criteria of 
listing products for special consideration had to be negotiated in the TNF. Once adopted, 
the process and modalities for eliminating intra-SADC trade barriers would form an 
integral part of the protocol and consequently of the SADC legal system.92 
 
The process and modalities for eliminating intra-SADC trade barriers have yet to 
be fully enunciated by the TNF leaving a lacuna in the implementation of the protocol. 
This illuminates an underlying uncertainty which is yet to be clarified. Further, since the 
inception of the SADC free trade area in 2008 several derogations were granted under 
Article 3(c). The legal principles in terms of which this has happened and the procedure for 
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monitoring compliance are not known.93 This state of affairs undermines legal certainty 
and is ultimately perilous to intra-regional trade. It also results in the imperfect functioning 
of the free trade area, particularly where exceptions to the tariff and related trade rules 
should be based on solidly outlined provisions.  
 
3.4Exemptions from the provisions of the Protocol 
The foregoing provisions of the trade protocol are further accompanied by specific 
exceptions. The protocol allows member states to enact contrary policies provided they are 
‘necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; protect human, animal or 
plant life or health; protect intellectual property rights, or to prevent deceptive trade 
practices; relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and the 
environment; or necessary to ensure compliance with existing obligations under 
international agreements94’ among other exemptions. 
These broad derogations are qualified with the provision that such measures are 
acceptable so long as they are not applied in a manner which does not constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between member states, or amount to a 
disguised restriction on intra-SADC trade95. Although the qualification prima facie appears 
to protect the abuse of this provision, its practical effect impedes the promotion of intra-
regional trade. This was highlighted in the case of Tanzania and Zimbabwe who initiated 
these derogation provisions in the paper industry of the former and goods industries of the 
latter. 
 
At the February 2011 CMT meetings, Tanzania and Zimbabwe submitted requests 
for derogation from SADC tariff phase down obligations.96 Both requests were made by 
reference to Article 3of the protocol on trade. Tanzania made the request for derogation for 
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its paper industry to support it in achieving required economies of scale and to successfully 
compete in international markets. The request for derogation was for three years during 
which time Tanzania will apply a 25% tariff for industrial packaging grades. Trade data 
indicated that the sole SADC exporter of these products to Tanzania is South Africa, and 
thus any negative economic effects of the derogation are likely to be confined to that 
country.97 However, the negligible economic effects between Tanzanian and South African 
trade can have an overall effect on the amount of intra-regional trade within SADC. 
 
On the other hand, Zimbabwe had requested and was granted a two-year delay in 
their tariff liberalisation schedule for goods in Category C i.e. sensitive products. The 
protocol had originally envisaged complete liberalisation in these products by 2012. 
Zimbabwe’s grace period consequently delayed this full liberalisation goal to 2014. Not 
only did this delay the implementation of the protocols goals and objectives, this has meant 
that SADC’s exports of goods in category C to Zimbabwe (excluding South Africa) 
comprised only 3.3% of the total of SADC exports in these categories. 62% of the goods 
(comprising 3.3% of the total of SADC exports to Zimbabwe) originate from South 
Africa.98  
 
Although it may prima facie appear justified that Zimbabwe invoked this article to 
protect its own growing industry, the provision to delay the liberalisation schedule for the 
goods is far-reaching. It serves to consolidate the current status quo in relation to the trade 
balance within SADC and does nothing to encourage trade in the region. Perhaps a more 
comprehensive and less extreme compromise in balancing the interests of Zimbabwe’s 
industries and intra-SADC trade would have been to implement a gradual less swift 
reduction of tariffs. The Protocol should have included an express provision outlining this. 
Only in exceptional circumstances (where the gradual reduction would still be severely 
detrimental to a particular industry) could the delay be invoked. The CMT would be 
charged to determine this.    
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The protocol further enables member states to invoke a security exemption on any 
contrary measures for the purposes of maintaining peace.99Although this may appear 
justifiable, in practice this provision has to some extent hindered the goals of regional 
integration and ultimately the objectives outlined in article 2 of the protocol. The provision 
fails to define what exactly measures for the purposes of maintaining peace could be. As 
such, SADC countries may utilize this lacuna to widen the breadth of this provision to 
include certain protectionist measures which are inherently restrictive of the goals and 
objectives of the protocol.     
 
In light of this, member states are allowed to exclude certain goods and sectors 
from the general trade liberalization provisions of the Protocol. Each SADC member state 
has excluded certain goods from its tariff reduction offers and in practice it would appear 
that goods have been excluded for reasons other than those permitted by the protocol.100 In 
particular much exclusion seems to originate from an attempt to fulfill domestic interests 
which are opposed to have their sectors subject to international competition, or else 
because of alleged revenue needs of member country governments fearing loss of tariff 
revenues due to trade liberalization. Certain lobby groups in member states with strong 
commercial interests may concentrate their efforts in pressuring their government to place 
certain goods within the excluded category. Such groups are driven to safeguard their own 
interests in a particular market and such interests may be contradictory to the interests of 
the protocol and SADC as a whole.  
 
The cases of sugar and wheat flour illustrate the resistance to trade liberalization 
and as such are clear ‘violations of the spirit, if not the letter of the Protocol.’101 The major 
sugar and wheat flour producing countries have negotiated quota-limited access to the 
South African market. Such quotas are innately a threat to the promotion of intra-regional 
trade and the trade protocol must be amended to address this problem. If intra-SADC trade 
is to be boosted, any unnecessary limitation on trade must be eliminated. SADC has a total 
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of 8 sugar producing states namely: South Africa, Tanzania, Swaziland, Zambia, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.102 The sugar industries in these countries are 
dictated by political and local considerations. Sugar is a large driver of the economies of 
these SADC countries as they generate large amounts of foreign exchange, contributing to 
the gross domestic products and government revenue. As such distortions exist in the form 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in this product.103 This is a problem inherent with 
the Protocol: It fails to provide a systematic calculation of which products and industries 
truly deserve to be excluded from its provisions. The sugar industries in some of these 
countries are well developed with some contributing significantly to member states gross 
domestic product104. As such, they should be mature enough to with stand competition 
within the region allowing the creation of economies of scale which would subsequently 
boost intra-regional trade.   
 
Other SADC countries went even further as Tanzania notified the CMT in February 
2011 that it had re-imposed tariffs on sugar products.105 It requested an ex post derogation 
for these tariff increases. Sugar tariffs for Tanzania had previously been phased down 
under Tanzania’s obligations under the SADC protocol on trade. However, in recent years, 
sugar imports have increased substantially from US$ 41.5 million in 2008 to US$ 92.4 
million in 2010. Sugar imports from SADC Member States more than quadrupled during 
this time from US$ 4.2 million in 2008 to US$ 17 million in 2010.106 It is clear that intra-
regional trade in sugar during this period experienced rapid growth due to the successes 
achieved by the trade Protocol in reducing tariff barriers to trade. The sugar industry in 
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Tanzania is a substantial employer with estimates that the sugar factories and the farms 
create jobs for approximately 65,000 people.107 
 
Consequently, for the countries within the SADC region which also produce and 
export sugar such as Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia, this has meant that 
trade with Tanzania was adversely affected. It effectively means that sugar products from 
other SADC countries are not able to favorably compete on the Tanzanian market due to 
the high tariff imposed on them contrary to the spirit and goals of the trade protocol. It is 
clear that although the derogations may appear to have helped Tanzania make its sugar 
industry stronger and competitive, the provision does little to improve intra-regional trade 
within SADC. This ultimately undermines the objectives of the protocol and SADC as a 
whole.  
 
While the protocol recognizes this and addresses this through placing it as part of 
the “sensitive products” category, it fails to go far enough in addressing the long term 
effects of these provisions on overall intra-regional trade. The legal principles which guide 
and monitor compliance in terms of which such derogations are made and the procedures 
for monitoring compliance with the exceptions provided by the protocol are not outlined in 
the Protocol. This leaves the provisions of the protocol open to abuse by member states 
and ultimately undermines the objectives of the protocol. The idea of liberalised global 
trade is based on the interaction between higher global income and comparative advantage. 
As such the sugar industries in SADC will ultimately also have to succumb to liberalized 
trade.108 The derogation provisions are innately flawed as they fail to outline monitoring 
provisions and guidelines for derogating and this consequently lead to flaws in the way 
member states use these provisions.  
 
While it can be argued that trade liberalization and facilitation within the SADC 
region is central to generating industrial and general economic growth to secure sustainable 
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and equitable development of the region, it could be also be argued that the continued use 
of special protection measures for small industries is necessary to secure a country’s 
development objective. This is poignantly reflected by the protocol itself which allows 
member states to safeguard minor industries as outlined in Article 21 of the Protocol.109 On 
the one hand, there appears to be no conflict between trade liberalization and the goals of 
industrial policy. The protectionist measure would spur the growth of the infant industry 
leading to the economic growth of the country in question and ultimately the region as a 
whole.  On the other hand, there seems to be a fundamental conflict between the goals of 
trade liberalization and protecting and promoting the growth of minor industries. 
 
Protectionist measures are innately a barrier to intra-regional trade and thus 
contrary to the trade liberalization. This paradox alludes to one of the many lacunas of this 
instrument. It is imperative that such contentions be addressed. It would be in the interest 
of regional integration and the objectives of the protocol to stipulate which provisions are 
to take precedence in order to deal with these conflicts. In this regard, the provision of 
relating to trade liberalization should have priority rather than the safeguarding of infant 
industries as the former is central to the goals of the protocol. The determination of this 
could be done by the CMT with some guidance given in the protocol outlining economic 
output of the industries as a starting point in determining whether an industry is still in its 
infancy. The temporary protection measures as they stand do not outline a specific timeline 
for the measure nor provide any guidance as to what industry qualifies for such a measure. 
The Protocol could stipulate that it is the CMT’s responsibility to weigh specific economic 
factors with the overall consideration being the promotion of intra-regional trade within 
SADC in line with the Protocol objectives.  
 
Moreover, it would appear that some countries in the region use article 21 as an 
escape clause for their binding obligations under the protocol to liberalize trade; countries 
use this clause to protect industry that are arguably large contributors to their economy. It 
would be prudent for the protocol to include a definition of what constitutes an ‘infant 
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industry’ to curtail the abuse of this provision which only serves to undermine trade 
liberalization and ultimately regional integration efforts. 
 
3.5National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Principle 
 
Like most regional integration instruments, the protocol introduces the concept of 
national treatment (NT) to SADC produced goods and products. This is the idea that all 
member states must provide the same treatment regarding regulations and requirements to 
SADC goods and products as the treatment rendered to goods produced nationally or 
locally.110 It follows that goods traded within SADC are to be accorded the same treatment 
as goods produced nationally in respect of ‘laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.’ 
This is complimented by a similar provision encapsulating the most favored nation 
(MFN) principle outlined in Article 28 of the protocol. This stipulates that member states 
must grant any preferential treatment given to a third party state (non-SADC) to other 
SADC states.111Consequently, member states are permitted to grant or maintain 
preferential trade arrangements with third countries, provided that such arrangements do 
not impede the objectives of the protocol. Further, any ‘advantage, concession, privilege or 
power’ given to a third country under such arrangements must also be given to SADC 
member states. Essentially, if for example a country like Tanzania is part of the East 
African Community (EAC) upon its induction into the SADC group it must ensure that any 
favorable treatment or advantage given to the EAC must also be given to the SADC 
member states.  
While this is necessary, the trade protocol fails to protect against threats to intra-
SADC trade and integration by stopping short of stopping the reciprocity of this provision 
in regards to similar instruments in other REC’s. The Protocol should have made it clear in 
its provisions that multiplicity of membership would not be allowed thus eliminating the 
need for a reciprocity provision. In the Tanzanian example, in its obligations under the 
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Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union (the EAC protocol), 
Tanzania is obliged to provide national treatment and non-discrimination to EAC 
products.112In light of this, Tanzania would have to provide the same concessions it 
provides to the EAC to the SADC as well. Essentially this would undermine the goals and 
aims on the SADC trade protocol in creating an internal market and ultimately a customs 
union. If SADC is to create a customs union and a common market it would be efficient 
and complimentary for the Protocol to only engage third party countries as a single bloc 
rather than permitting individual countries to enter into individual preferential trade 
agreements. Although the Protocol stipulates that the benefits of these agreements must 
also be afforded to other member states, it inherently undermines the mechanics of a 
customs union.    
The aims and objectives of the trade protocol to ultimately improve intra-SADC 
trade are further undermined when read in light of the MFN exceptions encompassed 
within the protocol. The SADC protocol goes on to provide that member states are not 
obliged to extend preferences of another REC of which they were a member at the time of 
the Protocol’s entry into force113. Fundamentally this provision allows SADC member 
states to maintain preferential agreements with third party states which are more beneficial 
to it than any SADC concession. [It is clear to see that the SADC trade protocol delayed 
addressing common external tariff policies of member states which might undermine 
integration in the region. Currently, a common external tariff is expected to be concluded 
in 2015 much later than originally anticipated by the protocol.114 Although this may have 
been delayed to cater for the interests of the SACU members within SADC115, this is 
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3.5.1 Non-Tariff Barriers 
Non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB) are trade barriers that restrict the flow of trade 
but are unlike the usual form of a tariff barrier. Most of these NTBs include quantitative 
restrictions, customs procedures, anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties. 
Although they may utilized as a means to evade liberal trade, they are permitted in some 
circumstances when they are deemed to be necessary to safe-guard public health and 
safety, sanitation or the depletion of exhaustible natural resources. The Protocol has largely 
failed to to address and balance these concerns.  
Border delays, toll fees and infrastructural problems within SADC trade routes 
operate to hinder substantial intra-regional trade. The Federation of East and Southern African 
Road Transport Associations (FESARTA) commissioned a report conducted in 2005 and 2006 
which found that consolidated multiple entry (CME) trucks travelling north from South Africa to 
Zimbabwe took on average more than two days to clear the Beit Bridge border crossing116. The 
study further found that Break bulk single entry (BBSE) loads fared better, generally taking around 
a day to clear the crossing, while refrigerated goods and oil tankers passed through much quicker. 
This is significant in terms of trade within the region as the Beit Bridge border crossing is 
the busiest border post not only within SADC but on the entire African continent117.  Consequently, 
the restriction of trade here would have substantial impact on trade within the region. The Protocol 
on trade should have included express provisions in dealing with administrative procedures at 
border posts throughout the region to facilitate smooth trade. Further, the Protocol should have 
gone as far as creating one stop border posts within SADC. An example of the benefits of these one 
stop border posts can be illustrated with the Zambian Chirundu border. 
The Chirundu border post between Zambia and Zimbabwe was first conceptualized in 
2005 and essentially means that each nation holds onto its rights and the co-operation between the 
two countries is coordinated by a bilateral agreement that gives each country authority to enact its 
rule on the other side of the border, meaning one stop, instead of two. This would boost SADC and 
Africa's trade and economic growth.  It has been estimated that savings in time values of border 
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delays at Chirundu are as high as $600 000 a day118. As such, it is imperative that the Protocol 
crystalizes such administrative processes through an express provision establishing similar one stop 
border posts through-out the SADC region.  
Moreover, the use of road transportation remains a significant mode of intra-regional trade 
within SADC. Though SADC has an extensive road network, there is a variation between members 
in the general condition of their respective road networks. In general, less than 20% of total roads 
are paved119 representing another significant NTB. Each member state has been taking to 
rehabilitate, maintain and upgrade the conditions of the road network within their respective 
boundaries. For example, in Lesotho, the road network is constantly being expanded and upgraded, 
especially with the Lesotho Highlands Water Project120. While SADC enacted a Protocol on 
Transport, there are no binding commitments on member states to ensure that road networks are 
maintained to facilitate trade 
The Protocol on Trade missed an opportunity to expound on these issues through 
stipulating binding obligations on member states consistent with the Transport Protocol to ensure 
that road networks are not a hindrance to trade. Rather than leaving it to the individual member 
states prerogative to decide how much to invest in road infrastructure the community through the 
trade protocol could have had express provisions which directly influence the economic policy of 
its members in a manor favorable to intra-regional trade.  
3.5.2 Quantitative Restrictions 
Quantitative restrictions refer to a ban on imports or exports after a determined 
quantity or a quota has been reached. Member states of SADC are obliged not to invoke 
these under their WTO commitments121 and also pursuant to the SADC trade protocol.122 
Despite this, quantitative restrictions are prevalent in SADC not only with the sugar 
industry as previously outlined but also in relation to other industries. It seems the main 
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driving force for these appears to be the need to protect and safeguard the local industry 
from international competition123. This was the case in Zambia as the Minister of 
Agriculture in that country confirmed the restrictions of exports in maize. It was deemed 
necessary to enact the ban until such a time as Zambia was able to consistently produce 
surplus maize for exports.124 
More recently, Zimbabwe has through legislation introduced a surtax of 25% on a 
number of commodities which began in the year 2012.125 This was enacted to protect 
Zimbabwean producers from what the government called “extensive imports.”126 It follows 
that instead of SADC member states legislating rules that encourage and promote intra-
regional trade, the rules which they introduce are inconsistent with the spirit and objectives 
of the Protocol and the SADC as a whole. The Protocol should have gone further in its 
provisions in this regard to automatically render such legislation inconsistent and 
consequently null and void.   
3.5.3 Rules of Origin 
The rules of origin enable the preferential trade agreements to be correctly 
implemented, which promotes the development of trade and encourages investment. They 
have been defined as ‘the specific provisions, developed from principles established by 
national legislation or international agreements applied by a country to determine the 
origin of goods.’127 
Without such rules third country imports are likely to enter the preferential trade 
area through a lower tariff member of the trade agreement so as to avoid the payment of 
duties. Thesis called ‘trade deflection’ and is more likely to occur where the external tariffs 
of the REC vary greatly. These rules are not only necessary to protect against trade 
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deflection but are also essential in promoting local value edition.128 This is in line with the 
idea that regional integration is an essential vehicle for which member states can utilize to 
promote industrialization. The trade protocol reflects this as it clearly states that the 
enhancement of the economic development, diversification and industrialization of the 
region is one of its main objectives.129 
The rules of origin that were first agreed by SADC and described in the original 
trade protocol were simple, general and consistent with those in other developing country 
REC’s.130 They included both general conditions stipulating that simple packaging, 
assembly and labeling, for instance, are insufficient to confer originating status131, and 
specific rules setting out minimum levels of economic activity. Under the specific rules 
goods would qualify for SADC tariff preferences if they underwent a single change of 
tariff heading, contained a minimum of 35 percent regional value-added, or included non-
SADC imported materials worth no more than 60 percent of the value of total inputs 
used.132 Agricultural and primary products would need to be wholly produced or obtained 
in the region. 
Moreover, certain SADC member states sought to establish more extensive rules of 
origin in what was seen as an attempt to afford protectionism to certain sectors in their 
respective economies.  This consequently led to a change in the rules of origin regime.  
The amended trade protocol was changed and is now characterized by ‘made-to-measure’ 
sector-specific rules that are far more restrictive.133The change of tariff heading 
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requirement was replaced by multiple transformation rules and detailed descriptions of the 
required production processes for products to be deemed originating from SADC.134  
An annex to the trade protocol sets out the mechanics of the rules of origin in the 
SADC context. The rules outline a set of criteria in which goods can be said to be 
originating from a member state. Firstly, goods are deemed to be originating from a 
member state if they have been ‘wholly produced’ in a member state.135 This includes 
products manufactured in a factory of a member state exclusively obtained from within the 
member states. Secondly, goods are considered as having originated from the member 
state, if those goods ‘have been obtained in any Member State incorporating materials 
which have not been wholly produced there, provided that such materials have undergone 
sufficient working or processing in any Member State within the meaning of paragraph 2 
of this Rule.’136 
Paragraph 2 then goes on to refer to a separate appendix setting out the conditions 
to be fulfilled by such products. The protocol outlines a specific set of columns for each 
product in relation to the harmonised system of tariffs which specifies whether or not 
(depending on the columns subscribed to the particular product) the product can be 
regarded as originating within the SADC region. These complex rules of origin are in 
themselves a barrier to trade within the region and thus undermine the central objective of 
the trade protocol to liberalise trade within SADC. The rules of origin are supposed to 
encourage producers to take advantage of them by gaining lower tariffs for their goods and 
thus encouraging trade. However if they confuse and complicate the determination of 
whether a product qualifies for the lower tariff, they would ultimately negatively affect the 
original objective. 
The impact of such complex provisions is particularly highlighted when examined 
in light of the textiles/garment industries in the SADC region. This is one of the few 
manufacturing sectors in which there is significant production in a number of member 
states. There are differences in some areas in this market such as labor intensity and other 
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determinants of comparative costs at various stages in the textile and garment ‘value 
chain.’ This has meant that there are potentially significant complementarities among 
member states which if addressed by SADC trade initiatives such as the trade protocol, the 
region’s competitiveness in world markets may be enhanced. 
Currently, the movement to SADC free trade in textiles and garments is slow, and 
the sector is subject to relatively complex transitional arrangements.137 Most non-SACU 
Member States have postponed significant tariff reductions until very late in the transition 
process. The rules of origin require double transformation in order to qualify for SADC 
tariff preferences. Garments must be made from regionally produced textiles to qualify as 
originating from SADC. Fabric must be made from regionally produced yarns and equally 
yarn must be made from uncarded, uncombed fiber or from chemical products. It was 
stated that the rationale behind these double transformation rules is that they will 
encourage regional sourcing and deeper integration of the regional textile and garment 
industries. However, upon closer examination of the impact these rules has had on the 
industry appears to contradict this. These double transformation rules increased the cost 
production within the SADC region. This meant that the most efficient producers of 
textiles and apparels mostly based in Asia have increased their share in SADC imports at 
the expense of SADC member states. It is estimated that the share of Asian imports as a 
per cent of SADC’s total textiles and apparel imports has risen from 44% to 58% in the last 
decade.138  
South African garment producers have expressed reservations at the rules stating 
that it would be difficult for them to meet the double transformation rules.139Since most 
South African garment makers cannot satisfy these rules of origin, due to the lower level of 
development of such industries in the wider region, it is highly unlikely that it could be met 
by non-SACU producers. Consequently, the SADC double transformation rule of origin 
will prevent preferential intra-SADC garment trade. This will enable South Africa to 
maintain its high protection policies on garments and fabric. Not only will it fail to 
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promote intra-SADC trade in this sector, it will do little to promote the global 
competitiveness of SADC textile and garment producers. Ultimately, such complex rules 
of origin as obtained in the protocol do little to enhance and achieve the goals of the 
instrument and SADC as a whole.  
This was further highlighted through empirical evidence which illustrated that 
where such rules were relaxed, exports in those sectors grew. The total value of exports in 
the textiles industry of the MMTZ countries to the region grew from US$ 29 million in 
2000 to US$ 78 million in 2006, which is equivalent to 169% growth.140 This was perhaps 
due to the fact that the double transformation rules of origin provided for an exception for 
these countries. Individually, in the same period Malawi’s exports in textiles to the region 
grew 199% while Zambia’s grew 278%.141 It follows that the rules of origin are supposed 
to be a tool to encourage industrial development as is the case with the exception for the 
MMTZ countries. However they increase cost of inputs, as they do with the general rules 
of origin encompassed in the trade protocol, they might have a detrimental impact on the 
original objective. Under such prohibitive rules, SADC members may consider exporting 
to other destinations where trade requirements are less restrictive. 
3.6 Impact on Trade  
SADC has implemented a solid foundation for accelerating regional trade and thus 
integration within the region. As outlined previously, the protocol established a 12 year 
implementation program for trade liberalization in the region in order to accelerate trade 
and integration. This tariff phase down process as captured in the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) is arguably SADC’s most important legal instrument 
in the community’s quest for deep economic integration as it sets the pace at which the 
elimination of intra-regional trade within the SADC will take place. Remarkable 
achievements have been made in the areas of goods and services integration, customs and 
in investment and finance. 
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The main objective of the protocol was the establishment of a FTA in SADC by 
2008 and then ultimately a customs union. The first steps where initiated with the trade 
liberalisation process which came into effect in September 2000. At the time the protocol 
was being implemented exports within SADC were valued at just over US$ 50 billion. By 
2006 after some years of implementing the protocol, this had more than doubled to more 
than US$ 113 billion.142It was reported that since the creation of the free trade area in 
2000, intra SADC trade nearly doubled from US$5.02 billion to US$10 billion in 2010, but 
the portion on SADC exports remained constant.143 Similarly, other data has shown that 
total exports in merchandise from the region to the rest of the world grew from $14 billion 
in 2000 to $58 billion in 2011.144 
Over all, intra-SADC trade actually decreased during the same period. The SADC 
region has actually reduced the amount of intra-regional trade during the period from 2008 
to 2009 with a decrease from $46.6 billion to $38.8 billion145 illustrating how despite the 
implementation of the Protocol problems of intra-SADC trade are not entirely resolved. 
However, even with tools such as the trade protocol in place there remains room for 
improvement if the goals and objectives of the protocol are to be achieved. The 
inconsistency and uneven impact of the Protocol is detrimental to the promotion of intra-
regional trade. Whilst some countries honor their obligations under the Protocol, others 
demonstrate a contrary commitment.146 The gaps within the Protocol have allowed certain 
member states to utilize them to hinder intra-regional trade through enacting measures that 
innately act as a barrier to trade.  Ultimately, the Protocol has made some impact on the 
promotion of trade within the SADC region. However it fails to address pertinent issues 
that hinder intra-regional trade, thus it falls short of achieving its stated objectives. 
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It follows that although the Protocol contains flaws which hinder trade its 
implementation has had some positive impact on the flow of trade within the region. In 
2000, trade between these SADC Members amounted to only US$ 6.67 billion. By 2009, 
intra-SADC trade had more than doubled to just over US$ 18 billion.147Exports from the 
region to the rest of the world had also grown exponentially.148 However, growth in trade 
has not been consistent. In the period between 2008 and 2009 intra-SADC trade decreased 
in monitory value.149 It appears that the gaps and weaknesses contained in the trade 
protocol have contributed to this inconsistency.  
The protocol outlined a phase down tariff reduction of 8 years in order to facilitate 
trade within SADC. The period given for these reductions may appear to have been 
unwarranted. Eight years was a long period of time to reduce these barriers to intra-
regional trade thus slowing down the goal to completely eliminate them. Although this 
period elapsed it would have been beneficial to the flow of intra-regional trade to have had 
a shorter period to remove these barriers. It would have facilitated trade within the SADC 
at a faster rate. Although it is important to consider member states that might be adversely 
affected by the sudden removal of all barriers to trade, it is equally essential not to take a 
laissez-fair approach in eliminating regional trade barriers.  
Increased trade between SADC countries might encourage them to specialize in 
order to gain a competitive advantage against neighbors that currently produce similar 
goods. It could assist in creating economies of scale within the region. The swift 
elimination of intra-SADC trade barriers has the potential to diversify and grow SADC 
economies. The slow pace of implementing agreed commitments on trade is likely to 
undermine the potential benefits of the trade protocol.  
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Moreover, derogation provisions within the Protocol could hinder the promotion of 
intra-SADC trade. The protocol provides for a number of derogations from the obligations 
established within it for example, the gradual phase down of tariffs. Although ensuring that 
any detrimental effects on a particular industry of a member state may be offset, this 
provision lacks a monitoring mechanism to regulate such derogations. The Protocol should 
have gone further to articulate or establish a set procedure for monitoring compliance with 
the exemptions. The lack of this has meant that the provisions are open to abuse by 
Member States who willingly invoke the derogation provisions with motives that innately 
hinder the objectives of the protocol and the objectives of SADC as a whole.  
This is further compounded by a further provision in the protocol which deals with 
third party preferential agreements within SADC. The protocol permits member states to 
grant or maintain preferential trade agreements with third parties as long as they do not 
impede or frustrate the objectives of the protocol and that these should be extended to other 
members.150 The protocol falls short of creating a common external tariff policy in dealing 
with non-member states. In the interest of cementing the creation of a customs union and 
ultimately a common market, the trade protocol should have enunciated the creation of a 
common external tariff.  
Perhaps one of the biggest challenges found within the trade protocol lays with the 
challenges caused by non-tariff barriers namely, qualitative restrictions and the rules of 
origin. During the negotiation process, certain member states demanded a tightening of 
these rules. Certain interest groups cited concerns that because of weak customs 
administration in many SADC member states there was a possibility for non-originating 
goods to claim preferences.151 Consequently, the organization enacted more complex rules 
of origin especially in manufactured products such as electronics and electrical goods, 
textiles and garments, and motor vehicles.  
These complex rules are not only a barrier to trade, but require a time consuming 
exercise in ascertaining the products conformity. Traders within the region are likely to be 
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deterred to use the rules which will further hinder intra-regional trade. It is necessary for 
SADC to simplify these rules if any attempt at increasing intra-regional trade is to register 
any meaningful success. Consequently, it is not surprising that without addressing these 
issues, the protocol on trade is unlikely to significantly increase intra-regional trade in line 





















SADC and the EAC: A Comparative Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The following discussion will attempt to highlight how the approach of the East 
African Community (EAC) has assisted that region in promoting economic integration of 
the region and ultimately accelerating intra-regional trade. Particular emphasis will be 
placed on how the structural mechanics of the institutional framework have helped create a 
solid foundation for economic integration. Through an examination of the way the 
mechanics of the organization function it will illustrate how similar challenges faced by 
SADC have been dealt with by the EAC. The chapter will outline the successes of the EAC 
thus far and illustrate how this goal might just be attainable. In light of this and the 
preceding discussion, this chapter will examine if perhaps the EAC may be a model for 
regional integration for SADC.  
 
4.2 The EAC: Background  
Like the SADC region, the history of regional integration in the East African 
Community (EAC) dates back to the colonial era. Regional integration here was also seen 
as a catalyst for affluence and economic growth. The initial moves towards cooperation 
between Kenya and Uganda were made as early as 1917152 under British colonial rule. 
These states formed a customs union which had subsequent changes to the agreements 
during the period covering 1917 – 1949.  Unlike most customs unions which have the 
objective of trade creation, this early attempt at regional integration was focused on 
revenue collection between these states. There existed a single customs administration for 
the two territories of Kenya and Uganda.  The customs union was further extended to cover 
Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in the 1920’s however; Tanzania maintained its own customs 
administration until early 1949. 
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It follows from the foregoing that as a result of the customs union in east Africa, 
the economies of the region were substantially integrated. As a corollary there was a 
common external tariff, a customs union and/or common market and a common income 
tax structure. Despite this, so far the attempts at regional integration in the east African 
region remained more of an effort to harmonize the administration of services rather than a 
solid attempt at creating a customs union. Moreover, the underlying problem of unequal 
distribution of costs and benefits remained the most potent stumbling block in the regional 
integration endeavor.  
The first EAC consisted of a common market with corporations and common 
services. However, sometime after its establishment, it became clear that the organisation 
was not going to survive. There was a severe lack of steering functions due to a lack of 
direction for the EAC. In 1977 the member states of the first EAC withheld the approval of 
the budget for the year beginning 1 July 1977153.  Thus in that year the first EAC collapsed.  
4.2.1 The Current EAC 
It follows from the foregoing that Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda continued to 
pursue economic integration through individual multilateral agreements. A groundbreaking 
announcement in this regard was made in November 1991 as the heads of state of the three 
countries articulated a strong intention to re-launch the EAC. Essential steps towards 
establishing this new EAC community were taken in 1993 at two summits of the heads of 
state. In the same year, the Permanent Tripartite Commission for Cooperation was 
established. It was envisioned that this would stand as a coordinating institution for the 
ultimate establishment of the new EAC. In 1994 provision was made for the establishment 
of a secretariat of the commission which was to begin working towards establishing the 
new REC in 1996. The following year the heads of state pushed the commission to work 
towards the upgrading of the earlier treaty establishing the EAC. 
Ultimately, the commission in 1998 produced a draft treaty for the new EAC. 
During this period, cooperation on other matters such as security was also initiated. By 
November 1999, the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (the 
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Arusha treaty) was signed by the heads of state of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania and 
subsequently entered into force on 7th July 2000 with the formal launch of the new EAC 
taking place in January 2001. Two new members, Rwanda and Burundi, later joined the 
Community in 2007. 
With the dawn of a new EAC, the leaders of the region consolidated their desire to 
pursue economic integration in the region. This was highlighted as the EAC’s primary aim 
is to ‘develop policies and programs aimed at widening and developing co-operation 
among the partner states in political, economic, social and cultural fields.’154 
In pursuit of these aims the EAC envisions that this would be complimented by an 
endeavor to ensure the attainment of sustainable growth and development of the partner 
states through promoting balanced and equal development in the region155. This is a 
reflection of the overriding concern that the benefit of the regional integration agenda in 
this region was largely favoring the Kenyan economy. Greater attention has been paid to 
fair distribution of the benefits of cooperation as this was a severe stumbling block to the 
successful functioning of the former EAC. The new EAC ensures this through transitional 
customs regulations which are designed to protect the Tanzanian and Ugandan economies 
from the dominance of Kenyan exports. 
The disparities between the economies within an REC’s can be a significant 
stumbling block to the efficiency and ultimately to the success of the bloc. This problem is 
most poignantly evident in SADC as the South African economy is significantly larger 
than any other economy in that region. A dominating regional economy should be prepared 
to accept the benefits of integration such as access to the regional market whilst at the same 
time maintain policies which although might seem to favor the other members of the block, 
seek to restrict the entrenchment of the economies of the other member states. This 
prevents products from the larger economies flooding the markets of the smaller less 
developed states thus completely undermining the idea of comparative advantage which 
regional integration is supposed to encourage.  
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Such policies must aim to act as a catalyst for creating comparative advantages in 
the region through the promotion of investments by governments from the dominant 
economy into the rest of the region. These investments could lay the foundation for the 
promotion of the production capacities of these other states thus ultimately encouraging 
industrialization which is essential in promoting economic growth and development. In the 
long run, this would in turn benefit the larger economies in these regions. The importance 
of this is further consolidated in Article 6(e) which stipulates that the equal distribution of 
benefits is one of the organization’s fundamental principles.  
The EAC aims to achieve integration through four distinct phases. These are a 
customs union, a common market, a monetary union and finally a political federation. The 
customs union officially came into force in January 2005 amid discussions of developing 
the protocol for a common market that will include provisions for the free movement of 
persons, labor and services, and freedom of business establishment within the EAC. This 
can be seen as a significant departure from the traditional approach taken by regional 
economic communities. Whereas most REC’s such as SADC began integration through 
establishing preferential trade blocs, the Arusha treaty seems to take the view that 
economic integration begins in earnest through the creation of a customs union.   
The EAC also outlined operational principles to assist in the implementation of 
these objectives. One of which is the ‘establishment of an export oriented economy for the 
partner states in which there shall be free movement of goods, persons, labor, services, 
capital, information and technology156.’ 
 
Here the EAC consolidates its ground breaking efforts at regional integration 
through wording that illustrates a clear intent to create a common market. The aim to create 
an export oriented economy further demonstrates the fundamental idea that the regional 
integration endeavor acts as a catalyst for industrialization within the member states. The 
Arusha treaty moves on to attach conditions on which member states must fulfill in pursuit 
of this. Member states are obliged to align their economic policies with those of the 
community, and refrain from any action which may undermine the implementation of these 
                                                          
156
 Arusha Treaty, Article 7 (c)  
51 
 
aims and objectives157. Moreover, member states were given a timeline of 12 months from 
the entry into force of the treaty to enact legislation necessary for the implementation of 
the Arusha treaty158.   
 
It follows from the foregoing that the Arusha treaty represented a new innovation in 
regional integration in Africa and departed from the traditional approach to the stages of 
economic integration. A new feature was introduced which other REC’s in Africa have so 
far not included in their treaties. The Arusha treaty implores member states to provide 
regulations, directives and legislation of the community the force of law in their respective 
states159.  This seminal provision is crucial in the effective and efficient implementation of 
the organisations trade policies as it allows those policies to be directly effective. 
Practically, it has the potential to have a far reaching effect on the mechanics of the 
regional integration efforts in the region. This is consolidated by a similar provision which 
articulates that the ‘community organs, institutions and laws will take precedence over 
similar national matters’ in relation to the implementation of the treaty160. 
 
The new organisation has also made changes to the way the former EAC was 
functioning. The management of cooperation has been improved through setting up 
permanent institutions. Secondly, the EAC now allows civil society and market forces to 
play a more prominent part. The EAC appears to have come back with a strong framework 
from which to accelerate economic integration in the region. This is a welcome departure 
from the apparent failures the organisation experienced previously.  
4.2.2 EAC Institutional Framework 
The Arusha treaty established a number of core institutions to manage the 
mechanics of regional integration in the region. These institutions when examined in light 
of their establishing treaty appear to have an innate separation of powers principle 
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enshrined in them161. The treaty established the Summit of the heads of state of 
government, the Council, the Co-ordination Committee, Sectoral committees, the East 
African Court of Justice (EACJ), East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) and the 
Secretariat162.  
The summit consists of the heads of state of government and much like many 
African REC’s, it is the highest executive organ of the EAC. It is there to provide the 
general direction towards the realization of the goals of the organisation. Although it may 
delegate some of its functions such as the review of peace and stability in the region, the 
summit cannot do so in relation to its core functions. These include the appointment of the 
Judges of the court of justice, the admission of new members and assenting to the bills of 
the EAC. The meetings of the summit occur once every year, however, extraordinary 
summits maybe called by any member state. These are chaired by a chairperson. The 
position is rotates on a yearly basis. The decisions of the summit are taken by a consensus 
with its business discussions submitted to it by the council. The summit determines its own 
rules of procedure subject to the provisions of the treaty163. 
On the other hand, the council of ministers is the main decision making institution. 
It consists of ministers from each of the member states responsible for EAC affairs and 
such other ministers as the summit may deem relevant164. The duty of the council is to 
promote, monitor and keep under constant review the implementation of the programs of 
the community. They must also ensure the proper functioning and development of the 
community in line with the provisions of the treaty. The council also has the responsibility 
of passing on bills to the legislative body for enactment, establish the sectoral committees 
and consider the budget of the community among others165. Most significantly, the Arusha 
treaty gives the council the power to make regulations and issue directives166 which may 
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be given full force of law as per earlier provisions in the treaty167. As outlined earlier this is 
a significant element in the mechanics of the EAC institutions. An apparent change from 
the dominance of the summit in creating binding decisions as is the case with most African 
REC’s.  
Meanwhile, the co-coordinating committees consist of permanent secretaries 
responsible for regional cooperation in each of the member states and reports to the council 
directly. It is tasked with coordinating the activities of the sectoral committees as well as 
being responsible for regional cooperation. It is also responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the treaty and the execution of the decisions of the council168.  The 
sectoral committees which are overseen by the coordinating committees develop 
comprehensive implementation programs in various sectors and monitor their 
implementation. They are established by the council upon the recommendation of the 
coordinating committees. They must be deemed necessary for the achievement of the 
objectives of the EAC to be established.  
One of the most important organs of the EAC is the EACJ. This is the judicial 
organ of the EAC and its role is to ensure that community law is interpreted and applied in 
a consistent manner with the objectives of the Arusha treaty. Significantly, the treaty 
extends the jurisdiction of the court beyond what most African REC’s have so far done. It 
provides for the extension of jurisdiction of the EACJ to such matters as ‘original, 
appellate, human rights and other jurisdiction’ which the council of ministers may deem 
relevant169. This must be implemented through the enactment of a protocol.  
The Arusha treaty also provided for the establishment of the EALA. The body is 
the main legislative organ of the EAC and provides a forum of debate for issues affecting 
the organisation. It has a cardinal function in the promotion of the community objectives. 
This is reflected in the mission of the body which articulates an intention to legislate, do 
oversight and represent the people of east Africa in an attempt to foster economic, social, 
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cultural and political integration170. The treaty stipulates that the EALA’s duties 
include liaising with the national assemblies of the Partner States on matters relating to the 
Community; debating and subsequently approving the budget of the community; 
considering the annual reports on the activities of the community, annual audit reports of 
the Audit Commission and any other reports referred to it by the Council; discuss all 
matters pertaining to the community whilst making recommendations to the Council as it 
may deem necessary for the implementation of the treaty171. 
Furthermore, the treaty established the secretariat of the EAC as the executive 
organ of the organisation. It consists of the secretary general, deputy secretary general, 
counsel to the community, and other unspecified offices which may be established by the 
council as and when they are deemed necessary172. The secretariat also ensures that the 
regulations and directives issued and adopted by the council are properly implemented. 
Ultimately its duty is to ensure the efficient administration of the functions of the 
community; forwarding bills to the assembly through the coordination committee and 
planning, monitoring and management of the programs of the community. 
The organisation’s overall policy direction has been influenced by a succession of 
development strategies. The first of these came into effect in the late 1990’s, prior to the 
establishment of the current EAC. This was named the East African Co-operation 
Development strategy and was in operation from 1997 up until 2000. It focused on the 
development of a policy framework for regional co-operation which as previously outlined 
lead to the enactment of the Arusha treaty. The second development strategy subsequently 
focused on the implementation of the treaty and ran from the period beginning 2001 and 
ending 2005. This concerned itself with the implementation of regional projects and the 
establishment of the customs union. Most recently, the third development strategy between 
2006 and 2010 sought to prioritize the development of areas relating to the promotion of 
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peace and security, common economic interests and human resource development in east 
Africa among others173.    
The EAC also includes a number of autonomous institutions which are responsible 
for various functions relating to the development of the EAC. They were established by the 
summit under the article 9 (1) (h) of the treaty and they deal with issues ranging from 
environmental issues to financial and educational matters. These institutions include the 
Lake Victoria Basin Commission, the Lake Victoria Development Programme, the East 
African Development Bank (EADB), the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation and the 
Inter-University Council for East Africa174. Most notably the EADB offers a broad range 
of financial services in the member states of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda with 
an overriding objective of strengthening socio-economic development and regional 
integration. As of December 2007 the capital structure of the bank had been increased from 
US $69 million to US $150 million with an equity fund of up to $500 million175. This 
ensures that the bank provides financial and related assistance to enterprises in the member 
states which, by their activities, are expected to make a positive contribution to socio-
economic development and ultimately contribute to the economic integration of the region. 
4.3 The EAC Customs Union  
In light of the analysis at hand, the most relevant aspect of the EAC in relation to 
the SADC protocol on trade is the EAC Protocol on the Establishment of The East African 
Customs Union (the customs union protocol). One of the fundamental and seminal steps 
towards trade liberalization in the EAC came with the establishment of the customs union. 
The customs union protocol was signed by the presidents of the member states at a summit 
of the heads of state on the 2nd of March 2004 and came into force on 1st of January 2005. 
It was envisaged that by 2010 the EAC would have created a fully functioning customs 
union. Consequently, the member states adopted the East African Community Customs 
Management Act. This is an act of the community which is applied across the EAC as the 
main legal instrument for the operationalisation of the custom union. 
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Central to the objectives of the customs union is the promotion of intra-regional 
trade through the elimination of internal tariffs and non-tariff barriers in an attempt to 
create one large single market and investment area176. The policies relating to trade 
between the member states and non-members (external tariffs) were to be harmonised. As 
was the aim within the SADC region, the EAC member states ultimately sought to create 
economies of scale subsequently promoting economic development through rapid 
industrialisation. To achieve this, the protocol stipulates areas in which the member states 
are to cooperate. Specifically, the customs union protocol provides that member states 
cooperate in among others; 
‘matters concerning trade liberalisation; trade related aspects including the 
simplification and harmonisation of trade documentation, customs regulations and procedures 
with particular reference to such matters as the valuation of goods, tariff classification the 
collection of customs duties, temporary admission, warehousing, cross-border trade and export 
drawbacks…177’ 
The provisions ensure that member states create uniform policies and procedures 
assisting the region to harmonise and integrate efficiently. This will ensure that there is a 
more stable and predictable economic environment for investors and traders in the region. 
Complementing these provisions, the protocol further stipulates that member states must 
exchange trade information for the prevention, investigation and suppression of customs 
offences as well as the operation of a harmonised information system to facilitate the 
sharing of customs and trade information178. This included an undertaking to standardise 
their customs nomenclature and standardise their foreign trade statistics to ensure 
comparability and reliability of the relevant information.    
 
Member states are also obliged to reduce the number and volume of documentation 
required in respect of trade among them. The simplification of trade documents aims to 
facilitate intra-regional trade in goods as it addresses one of the non-tariff barriers to trade. 
This is further complimented by the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding 
System179. Initially, the tariff system was based on the 2002 version of the harmonised 
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system however, in June 2007 the EAC common external tariff was revised to conform to 
the 2007 version. This came into force on the 1st of July 2007180. 
This is specifically relevant in the SADC context due to the challenges posed by 
NTB’s in that region. The administration documents and processes within SADC border 
posts remain a hindrance to trade as the Protocol fails to address them. As such a lesson 
could be drawn in this regard in order to ensure the removal of these NTB’s and facilitate 
trade. 
4.3.1 Internal/Common External Tariff 
The customs union protocol requires that all member states remove and eliminate 
all internal tariffs. This covers all tariffs in relation to goods from a member state which 
are being traded into another member state and other charges of equivalent effect, subject 
to the principle of asymmetry. The asymmetry principle recognises that the member states 
may be at different levels of development. As such those member states that are at a less 
advanced level are entitled to a measure of protection of their domestic industries in order 
to spur growth. This reflects earlier concerns about the disparities between the larger 
Kenyan economy compared to those of the economies of the other member states. This 
was especially more vital with the addition of Rwanda and Burundi into the EAC.   
If the customs union were not to have taken account of the disparity between the 
region’s economies, these differences may have been aggravated further.  It follows that 
the protocol provided for a transitional period of 5 years from the coming into force of the 
protocol for the elimination of these internal tariffs181. To this end goods from Uganda and 
Tanzania into Kenya were granted duty-free status as at the effective date of the protocol, 
whilst goods from Kenya into Uganda and Tanzania were grouped into two categories – 
Category A goods, which were eligible for immediate duty free treatment and Category B 
goods, which were eligible for gradual tariff reduction over a period of five years182. 
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In addition to the elimination of internal tariffs, the member states sought to create 
a common external tariff (CET) in relation to non-EAC member states. This is one of the 
most important elements of the customs union. The EAC agreed to a three-band CET; a 
minimum rate of zero percent, a middle rate of 10 percent and a maximum rate of 25 
percent183. The rates are to be applied to primary and capital goods, intermediate goods and 
final products respectively. The primary goods are said to be essential for production thus 
were given the lower rate thus helping to boost manufacturing in the EAC. Intermediate 
goods under this provision are those which have been processed but still require some 
other processing to be complete. While final goods are end products which have been fully 
processed and are ready for consumption. Moreover, the maximum rate is subject to 
review after five years from the effective date of the Protocol.  
The EAC member states agreed during the negotiations that under the tariff rates 
there would be special safeguards for protecting particular revenues stemming from 
particular industries. As such, the tariff system introduced special tariff rates for goods 
such as rice, wheat, milk, flour, sugar, cigarettes cement and cotton among others. 
Collectively, these sensitive items are equivalent to approximately 361 tariff lines and are 
estimated at about 20 percent of total imports in the region. The EAC member states 
agreed that the sensitive items would attract rates of more than 25 percent and, in some 
instances, a mixture of specific duty and ad valorem rates184. The common external tariff 
entered into force in January 2005.  
These protectionist measures reflect a skepticism by most African countries 
involved in regional integration schemes to fully liberate trade. Similarly, SADC has also 
had to confront similar issues in relation to products such as sugar which were given 
import quotas in some member states of that region. It can be said that such policies are 
innately restrictive of trade and thus ultimately undermine the efforts towards regional 
integration in the respective regions. These may appear to encourage weak industries to 
strengthen and become more competitive, but they remain a barrier to trade and thus 
regional integration.    
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4.3.2 Non-Tariff Barriers and National Treatment  
Naturally, the Arusha treaty provides for the removal of non-tariff barriers and also 
provides for the national treatment principle which is central to any regional integration 
initiative. The protocol places a duty on member states to immediately and completely 
remove any non-tariff barriers. Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) refer to restrictions that result 
from prohibitions, conditions, or specific market requirements that make importation or 
exportation of products difficult and/or costly. These are essentially anything apart from 
actual tariff restrictions. However, the EAC defines NTB’s as quantitative restrictions and 
specific limitations that act as a hindrance to trade. 
As a corollary, the protocol further prohibits partner states from enacting legislation 
or applying administrative measures which directly or indirectly discriminate against the 
same or like products of other partner states. In addition partner states are prohibited from 
imposing on goods originating from other partner states internal taxation in excess of that 
imposed on similar domestic products. It is essential for the non-tariff barriers to be 
removed so that the benefits of liberal trade may be achieved. If not addressed the non-
tariff barriers may vitiate most of these benefits.  
In 2006 the EAC council of ministers adopted a mechanism for monitoring non-
tariff barriers. Before this, the member states had used an ad hoc system which was 
supported by the business community within the region. The secretariat in collaboration 
with the East African Business Community had developed simplified guidelines and 
publicity material for use in implementing the removal of non-tariff barriers. A trade 
remedies committee was also established with a duty to refer complaints to the secretary of 
the relevant sectoral council for further investigation.    
Moreover, as with most regional integration schemes, specific provisions were 
enacted to enshrine the principle of national treatment. The objective of this principle is to 
prohibit discrimination by a partner state against goods originating from another partner 
state, by requiring that partner states accord the same treatment to goods imported from 
other partner states as they would give to goods produced domestically. It follows that any 
member state is prohibited from enacting ‘legislation or apply administrative measures 
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which directly or indirectly discriminate against the same or like products of other partner 
states.’ 
Despite this, a number of NTB’s remained which effectively hindered trade within 
the region. The East African Business Council (EABC) released a report which highlighted 
a few of these. These included Customs and administrative documentation procedures; 
Immigration procedures; Cumbersome inspection requirements; Police road blocks; 
Varying trade regulations among the three EAC countries; Varying, cumbersome and 
costly transiting procedures in the EAC countries; Duplicated functions of agencies 
involved in verifying quality, quantity and dutiable value of imports and exports; and 
Business registration and licensing185. It is clear to see that similar NTB’s exist within the 
SADC region as well as within other REC’s.  
NTB’s negatively affect the productivity of the EAC as they increase the cost of 
doing business and delay the overall business transactions. These hurdles ultimately hinder 
importers and exporters thus deter them from engaging in cross-border trade. It was this 
envisaged by the EABC that the introduction of the customs union Protocol would go 
some way in addressing these concerns.  
Under Article 13 of the Protocol on the establishment of the EAC Customs Union, 
each member state is obliged to remove all the existing non-tariff barriers to the 
importation into their respective territories of goods originating from another member state 
and thereafter not impose any new non-tariff barriers. SADC has also taken a similar 
approach with a corresponding provision in its protocol on trade. However, the EAC has 
gone further to establish mechanisms to monitor and eliminate NTB’s and establishing in 
each member state institutions for their removal. Such mechanisms include re-occurring 
studies of NTB’s within the region and a time bound NTB program which is constantly 
being updated186. This reflects the revolving nature of NTB’s and represents a significant 
effort in reducing the effects of NTB’s on trade.  
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The problems related to NTB’s and their negative effects on trade are a re-
occurring feature of any attempt at regional integration. The EAC has been effective in 
addressing this inherent nature of NTB’s as the EAC Secretariat is tasked with resolving 
these issues as and when they occur. In some cases a National Monitoring Committee 
(NMC) handles them while in other cases they are dealt with by a Regional Monitoring 
Committee (RMC). Further still, the EAC has in some instances sought bilateral solutions 
between member states in order to reach a satisfactory resolution in reducing the effect of 
the NTB.  
Perhaps the most far-reaching mechanism for dealing with NTB’s invoked by the 
EAC is in its online monitoring system. This system makes it possible for any stakeholder 
to directly report to the EAC Secretariat on any experience they have had with NTB’s187. 
The system enables the EAC to monitor NTB’s as they occur practically as businesses and 
traders operate in their cross border transactions. It ensures that the changing nature of 
NTB’s as they hinder trade on a daily basis is reported and documented to allow the EAC 
to respond with tailored solutions. This is a swift and effective way not only to eliminate 
NTB’s but ultimately to facilitate trade within the region.  
It is imperative that any REC’s response to NTB’s be constantly evolving in order 
to effectively eliminate the far-reaching detrimental effects of these barriers to trade. This 
is where the EAC has managed to respond effectively and efficiently to one of the most 
significant challenges faced by any regional integration scheme. However, in order to 
cement the gains made by the provisions of the customs union protocol of the EAC, there 
needs to be a separate and fully functional body which not only enforces these provisions 
but allows interested stakeholders to invoke them as a matter of law. Such a body would be 
extensive in its ability to promote intra-regional trade and integration.  
Similarly, the EAC first established bodies tasked with outlining a way forward for 
the region in the integration initiative. Once established the goal on boosting intra-regional 
trade through the customs union was further boosted through the establishment of a fast 
track committee with a mandate to find and propose different ways and means of 
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promoting intra-regional trade. The committee has so far filed a report as to ways in which 
the EAC can move forward to integrate and eventually create a political federation for the 
purpose of facilitating trade within the region188.  
This is a distant approach than that taken by SADC. Central to the goals of SADC, 
was the traditional approach to establishing a regional economic bloc. The organization 
sought to first establish a preferential trade area, then a free-trade area, customs union and 
a common market. SADC makes no mention of the desire to create a political federation 
(although its stated aims could be evidence towards this). As such the approach of SADC 
appears to be a more laissez faire. The EAC on the other hand, has a more aggressive 
attitude in promoting intra-regional trade reflected in the way the organization literally 
skips the first stages of regional integration and makes establishing a customs union a first 
step in the process.  
4.4 Rules of Origin  
In order for the previously outlined provisions to be effective, it is essential that 
goods originating within the EAC and outside of the region can be distinguished. One has 
to ascertain where the goods are from in order to establish which tariff to allocate to that 
particular product. They represent a legal framework within which the origin of goods is 
determined, both at point of shipment and where they are deemed to have been produced. 
However within the context of the EAC as well as SADC, rules of origin agreements are 
weakened by member states’ parallel memberships of different trade blocs. In the EAC 
particularly, Tanzania is one such example. The country is both a member of SADC and 
the EAC. This reflects an obstacle to regional integration in Africa. Many African 
countries have dual membership.    
It is against this background that the Customs Union Management Act enacted in 
2004 articulates that goods originating from outside the EAC will be given community 
tariff treatment in accordance with the rules of origin provided for under the protocol 
establishing the customs union. Annex III to the protocol encompasses the rules of origin. 
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It stipulates that goods shall be deemed to have originated within the EAC where they are 
‘wholly produced as provided for in Rule 5 of these Rules; or (b) they have been produced 
in a Partner State wholly or partially from materials imported from outside the Partner 
State.’ 
The aim of the provision was not only to ensure the implementation of the 
classification system but also to ensure uniformity among member states. It follows that 
when compared to the SADC rules of origin, the EAC rules articulate much simpler 
criteria for determining the origin of the goods in question. Goods have fewer hurdles of 
classification before they are determined to be from within the EAC while goods in SADC 
have to go through further more complex classification before obtaining their origin within 
SADC.  
This in itself ensures that the rules of origin in the EAC serve their purpose in 
eliminating barriers obtaining the classification of goods within the tariff system. If the 
rules of origin are too complex, they will ultimately serve as a barrier to trade as most 
traders who may qualify for a lower tariff classification may not be able to do so.  
Ultimately this would stifle intra-regional trade. Despite these simpler rules, the 
application of them has led to disputes within the EAC. In July 2010, Tanzania had refused 
to allow vehicles assembled in Kenya duty free on the grounds that they did not meet the 
requirements of the rules. This lead to a slowdown of expansion of the Kenyan firms into 
the EAC region adversely affecting the regional integration efforts envisaged by the 
customs union protocol.  
Following this dispute the EAC had to establish a verification commission to assess 
the vehicles and ascertain their compliance with the rules of origin. Simple operations such 
as packaging, mixing and assembly where the costs of the imported ingredients, parts and 
components used in any processes exceed 60 per cent of the total cost of the final product 
is not recognised under the rules of origin. The argument raised by Tanzania in this 
situation appears to be an attempt to further complicate the rules of origin as they required 
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specific technical information as to the components of the manufacturing process189.  This 
is clearly against the spirit and objective of the customs union protocol which aims to 
liberalise trade within the region. Blocking the sale of locally assembled vehicles in the 
region is a double loss because the member states would be flouting the common external 
tariffs.  
It would appear that while the rules remain simple in an attempt to foster intra-
regional trade, there is need for an agreement on the meaning of the rules of origin 
themselves. This should include internal tariff structures and local content regulations 
merely for the settlement of disputes and not for the determination of the tariff 
classification. Consequently, the EAC in 2006 introduced a manual on the rules of origin 
which deals with some of these issues. The East African Community Manual on the 
Application of East African Rules of Origin (rules manual) not only seeks to act as a tool 
for the training purposes of customs officials but also as a guide to traders, manufacturers, 
government officials and any other agencies or stakeholders involved in trade within the 
region. The rules manual essentially covers ‘the provisions governing the determination of 
the origin status of goods under the intra-EAC trade, the administration procedures of the 
rules of origin, simplified procedures for small scale cross border trade and organizational 
requirements for implementing the rules of origin190.’ 
The manual further seeks to translate the rules of origin for a practical translation, 
which allows for the smooth application of the rules of origin provisions. This ultimately 
ensures that the rules of origin provisions do not act as an unwitting barrier to intra-
regional trade. A similar approach should and must be taken by SADC if any meaningful 
elimination of barriers to intra-regional trade is to occur. As previously outlined, the rules 
of origin in SADC in an annex to the SADC protocol on trade set out the rules of origin 
used to determine which goods are eligible for preferential treatment as ‘originating 
goods’. The rules set out two criteria upon which they can be considered as such. The first 
categorises goods that have been wholly produced in any member state while the other 
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categorises goods that ‘have been obtained in any member state incorporating materials 
which have not been wholly produced there, provided that such materials have undergone 
sufficient working or processing in any member state within the meaning of paragraph 2 of 
this Rule.191’ 
Paragraph 2 as stated in the above provision moves on to articulate further 
conditions to be fulfilled by these products. This rather more complex application of the 
rules of origin by the SADC region does not make things easy for traders and business 
people in their cross border trading activities. Consequently this stands as a barrier to intra-
regional trade as the traders would be deterred from applying these rules to benefit from a 
lower tariff classification.  
4.5 Impact on Trade 
During the earlier years of the EAC (up until 1971) the treaty of the EAC was 
successful in restoring relatively free intra-regional trade. However, the EAC then 
experienced a decline in its trade volumes192.  This was perhaps owing to the institutional 
set up of the older EAC bloc. As previously outlined, Kenya was strategically positioned to 
reap the majority of the benefits of this earlier regional integration initiative. Moreover, the 
economies of Uganda and Tanzania at the time relied heavily on agricultural products 
whilst Kenya had a growing and more competitive industrial sector. The over dependence 
on agriculture for the smaller economies of Uganda and Tanzania further made the benefits 
of regional integration unclear. The unequal distribution of benefits illustrated that the 
regional integration does not benefit all its members in all circumstances.  
There was little scope to add value in terms of products or operational efficiency 
from mutual trade and cooperation between member states. As such intra-regional trade 
although encouraged by this earlier attempt at regional integration was not as successful as 
was envisaged. However, the treaty of the EAC at the time had minor success in 
addressing these trade issues in the region. The treaty addressed the inequality of the 
regional economies which lead to a decay of the protectionist policies of the large Kenyan 
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industries and the rise of similar industries in Uganda and Tanzania. This was largely 
based on the transfer tax system193.  
It follows that this for a long time, there remained a strong trade imbalance in the 
region in favor of Kenya. In 2005 before the effects of the customs union could have had 
any meaningful reflection on trade in the region, Kenya’s trade exports to the EAC 
comprised of 25.6% of its overall exports. The percentage for Tanzania was 7.9% whilst 
Uganda’s stood at 13.4%194.  In spite of this there remained a notable impact from the 
earlier EAC. During the period from 1990 up until 2004, there was an overall trade 
increase in the region by about 400%195. However, this may be attributed to the co-
operation agreements which the countries of the region had entered into prior to the 
signing of the Arusha treaty. 
In light of the foregoing, the establishment of the current EAC customs union has 
had a tremendous and far-reaching impact on trade within this region. Total intra EAC 
trade more than doubled growing from approximately US$1.61 million in 2006 to 
approximately US$ 3.8 million in 2010196 a total increase of 96%. Intra-regional trade in 
the EAC further rose to 23 per cent of the total value of exports in 2011. It was the highest 
increase in African regional economic blocs. Other estimates placed the growth trend in the 
value of intra-EAC trade to have more than doubled from US$ 2 billion in 2005 to over 
US$ 5 billion in 2013197. 
Similarly, the total inflow of foreign direct investment in the EAC region increased 
from US$1.3 billion in 2006 to US$1.7 billion in 2009198. This foreign direct investment 
has mainly occurred in the manufacturing sectors across the EAC region which has 
ultimately enabled the rapid industrialisation of the region’s economies. It follows that 
although the EAC has had some challenges in implementing the common external tariff, 
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eliminating internal tariffs among other things, it has been largely successful in the attempt 
to regionally integrate its economies. It is perhaps for this reason that the EAC was rated as 
one of the fastest growing and reforming economies in the world, according to the doing 
business report 2012199 and is consistently placed as one of the most successful regional 
integration attempts in Africa. Ultimately, other African regional economic blocs 
particularly SADC may draw lessons from the achievements attained by the EAC in 
dealing with the barriers to their own integration initiatives.  
4.6 Conclusion  
From the outset, it is clear to see that the approaches of SADC and the EAC are 
different. Although SADC was originally established to reduce economic dependence on 
South Africa as SADCC, the current EAC was an attempt to build upon the successes of 
the failure of the past integration strategies whilst learning from the past failures.  
Diverging practices and differences in the mechanics of the two organisations 
further become apparent in the way the organizations structures operate. The council in the 
EAC is able to issue directives and regulations which become directly enforceable. 
Essentially, policies and programs aimed at promoting intra-regional trade are able to have 
a first hand and immediate effect upon traders as they are able to invoke those policies to 
ensure lower tariff classifications, among other benefits. There is no similar provision in 
the mechanics of the SADC treaty and the trade protocol. This is consolidated by the fact 
that the EAC has the support of the court in applying and interpreting these provisions.  
The structure of the EAC appears to reflect and respect the idea of separation of 
powers. While the summit gives the general direction on policy in the EAC, other organs 
are able to enact and create binding decisions affecting integration and ultimately intra-
regional trade. The same cannot be said for SADC. There is no provision for the council 
within SADC making directly binding decisions as the summit remains the supreme body 
within the institution. SADC has thus far failed to create an independent supranational 
institution whose aim is to purely promote trade within the region. Most poignantly, the 
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organisation has serious flaws in its institutional set up. This was evident with the 
disbanding of the tribunal. Moreover, while the EAC provides for little or no derogations 
from treaty and customs union protocols, SADC still allows derogations from providing 
preferential trade agreements to third parties. Member states are not acting illegally if they 
maintain agreements with non-SADC countries. This in turn gravely undermines the 
growth of intra-regional trade.  
In light of this, it is not surprising that the EAC has been said to be one of the most 
successful REC’s in Africa. The EAC is now at the stage of a common market with 
initiatives towards creating a monetary union in progress200. In doing so, the EAC has 
managed to significantly improve its intra-regional trade. It is the region with the highest 
percentage of intra-regional trade in Africa. The share of intra-EAC exports in the region’s 
total exports increased from 18.7% in 2000 to 20.8% in 2010 while the share of total intra-
SADC exports in the region’s total exports stood at 15.3% in 2000 and 18% in 2010201. 
Ultimately, SADC might draw some lessons from the EAC in improving intra-regional 
trade not only in areas where there is a lacuna in the trade protocol and institutional flaws 
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Conclusion: The Way Forward for SADC 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will seek to summarize and conclude the gaps and shortfalls within the 
SADC protocol on trade. It will also make some suggestions on the way forward. 
5.2 Conclusions 
The discussion in this thesis identified certain provisions of the trade protocol 
which undermine its objectives as outlined in article 2. The protocol lays good foundation 
for promoting intra-regional trade which has seen total exports in merchandise from the 
region to the rest of the world grow from $14 billion in 2000 to $58 billion in 2011.202 
Despite this, total intra-SADC trade declined from $46.6 billion to $38.8 billion during the 
same period.203 Certain provisions in the protocol combined with NTB’s throughout the 
region contribute to this haphazard impact on trade within the SADC region. 
Consequently, the gaps within the trade protocol ultimately limit the attainment of the 
objectives of the protocol and consequently the goals of SADC as a whole.  
The derogation provisions outlined in article 9 of the protocol remain vague, broad 
and open to abuse. It was highlighted that the derogation provisions leave room for abuse 
by member states which in turn makes them a non-tariff barrier to trade. The derogations 
are in practice used by member states to fulfill domestic interests which often contradict 
the interest of promoting intra-regional trade204. The domestic interests largely appear to 
promote protectionist measures which hinder intra-SADC trade. This was illustrated 
through the Tanzania and Zimbabwe paper industries case where such exemptions were 
invoked and subsequently led to a substantial decrease in trade within these sectors. 
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On the other hand, the provisions allowing the maintenance of preferential trade 
agreements with third party states largely undermine the goal of attaining a free-trade area 
within SADC and ultimately a customs union. The trade protocol allows SADC member 
states to maintain preferential trade agreements with third party states as long as they are 
more advantageous than any SADC provision. This provision is inherently prohibitive of 
the objectives of the protocol to create a customs union. The protocol must aim to be the 
most advantageous instrument of trade to any SADC member state rather than conceding 
this to other agreements with non-member states. The trade protocol could have adequately 
addressed this through a prohibition provision, stopping member states from entering into 
such agreements with non-members. This is further compounded by the lack of a 
harmonised external tariff structure for the SADC states.  
The SADC protocol on trade should have illuminated a coherent and harmonised 
external tariff policy for its member states. Currently different interests and considerations 
exist in terms of the goals and aims of each member states tariff implementation. While 
most SADC states use tariffs as a form of income, South Africa utilizes tariff as a way to 
protect its local industries from external competition.205 This is naturally inconsistent with 
promotion of intra-regional trade as well as inconsistent with the goals of regional 
economic integration. Consequently, although the SADC trade protocol has enabled intra-
regional trade to grow, the growth attained has not been consistent or far-reaching to make 
substantial contribution to development in this region.  
Moreover, the provisions relating to the rules of origin in the SADC trade protocol 
and further amendments remain extremely complicated. The double-transformation rules 
enacted by the protocol and subsequent amendments are innately a barrier to intra-regional 
trade. Traders are unable to utilize the preferential trade agreements to apply to their 
products. The rules become cumbersome to apply which deters traders from receiving the 
benefits of the SADC trade protocol. This was most effectively highlighted through the 
mechanics of the textiles industries within the SADC region.  
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5.3 The Way Forward 
In light of the above concerns and of the approach taken by the EAC which had 
similar challenges in that region, some changes must be made to the SADC protocol on 
trade to consolidate the gains made in promoting intra-SADC trade as well as to further 
promote it. Although SADC aims to create a customs union and a common external tariff, 
the trade protocol must be amended to specifically enunciate the creation of this. The EAC 
managed to achieve this with their Customs Union Protocol and SADC must also take the 
same approach by having express provisions within the protocol on trade. Particular 
attention must be paid to the establishment of the tripartite free-trade area between SADC, 
the EAC and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).  
The interests of SADC within this tri-partite FTA would be protected through the 
provisions of the trade protocol. This would be especially effective if SADC included 
express provisions dealing with and establishing a common external tariff and eliminating 
the provision within the protocol which allows member states to enter into third party 
agreements so long as they are more beneficial. This would have a far-reaching effect in 
addressing the pressing issue of dual membership in RECs.  
Moreover, the rules of origin need to be amended to be made simpler and more 
practical for traders within the SADC region. Inspiration could be drawn from the rules of 
origin as encompassed within the Customs Union Protocol of the EAC. This would be 
beneficial in eliminating barriers to trade as well as promoting intra-regional trade.  
Perhaps the most far-reaching consideration that SADC must address lies within 
the issues surrounding NTB’s. These involve a wide range of issues which are constantly 
evolving and changing. Monitoring policies and mechanisms need to be established 
through an amendment of the trade protocol. Within the EAC this was dealt with through 
such measures as online reporting of NTB’s by traders to frequent reports by bodies within 
the organisation.  
Ultimately, for the SADC protocol on trade to be able to have a substantial effect 
on intra-regional trade and integration as a whole, SADC must also give broader 
considerations to issues outside the protocol. Particular focus must be given to the role of 
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an independent judicial body which stakeholders in regional trade can access to be able to 
invoke the benefits of the protocol on trade.  
The SADC Tribunal was disbanded through the controversial Campbell case which 
involved the contentious land grabbing issues in Zimbabwe. It was successfully argued by 
Zimbabwe that the Tribunal’s decision in the case was an infringement of its sovereignty. 
Although the Tribunal was reinstated by a decision of the Summit, its protocol only 
allowed for inter-state cases to be bought for adjudication.206 This is a significant barrier to 
trade as citizens within SADC are unable to invoke and enforce the provisions of the 
protocol against those who are acting contrary to the protocol. The direct effect application 
of the protocol would in itself promote regional intra-regional trade. 
On the whole, SADC remains on the right track in order to achieving its stated 
goals of economic integration. The instruments and institutions of SADC must remain 
flexible and evolve to accommodate and respond to the continuous challenges of trade.  
Ultimately, the SADC Protocol on Trade lay’s a good foundation for its stated objectives. 
However there are challenges posed by specific provisions within the Protocol. It is 
imperative for SADC to address these challenges by amending the Protocol to ensure that 
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